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Abstract
This thesis studies three issues in the field of implementation theory. In the first
chapter, I examine the implementation of social choice rules under strong Nash
equilibrium, when agents do not only care about the final outcomes, but also have
a small intrinsic preference for honesty. Specifically, an agent is partially honest if
she breaks ties in favour of a truthful strategy, when she faces indifference between
outcomes. I present sufficient conditions for implementation in such cases and
provide applications in matching and bargaining environments.
In the second chapter, I study the issue of decentralization from the implemen-
tation perspective. In most cases of institution design, a social planner is forced to
operate in a decentralized manner, by designing distinct institutions that deal with
different issues or sectors, over which agents may have complementarities in their
preferences. By utilizing the notion of a rights structure, I consider a two-sector
environment and examine the possibilities that arise in implementation when the
social planner can condition the rights structure of one sector to the one of the
other. We distinguish two cases, one when a sector constitutes an institutional
constraint (constrained conditional implementation), and one where both sectors
can be objects of design (conditional implementation). I characterize the social
choice rules that are implementable in the first case, while in the second case I
provide sufficient conditions for implementation. My results outline the difficul-
ties of implementation in decentralized environments. As applications, I include
some possibility results. First I prove the implementability of a weaker version of
the stable rule in a constrained matching environment with partners and projects
and second, I prove the implementability of the weak Pareto rule in a multi-issue
environment with lexicographic preferences.
In the third chapter, I extend the positive results obtained in Dutta and Sen
(2012) to the framework of rights structures. I show that the well-known unanimity
condition is sufficient for implementation in such an environment when there is at
least one partially honest agent.
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Alternative thesis format
This thesis is in alternative format and includes the following papers:
(i) Savva, F., 2018. Strong implementation with partially honest individuals.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 78, pp.27-34.
(ii) Savva, F., 2019. Conditional Rights and Implementation. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466832.
(iii) Savva, F., 2020. A note on partially honest implementation with rights
structures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Implementation theory provides a sharp tool that allows us to formally study
the design of institutions. Its success mostly lies on the surprising generality of
the results obtained, with minimal assumptions or structure on the environment.
Its aim is to formally study and understand the relationship between institutions
and social goals that is, how different institutional structures affect the attainable
outcomes that a society or group can achieve. The theory, in its early stage, can be
considered a by-product of, or has at least been inspired by, the socialist debate
in the 1920s, when scholars such as von Mises, Lange and Lerner debated over
whether a decentralized economic system would outperform a centralized one and
vice versa.
Hurwicz, inspired by the debate years later, laid the formal foundations that
could allow for a systematic and formal comparison of economic systems with his
contributions Hurwicz (1960) and Hurwicz (1972). Since these early contributions,
the literature has flourished and has provided a very detailed outline on what a so-
cial group can aim to achieve. Hurwicz’s contribution boils down to an immensely
important aspect of institution design, that of incentive compatibility. Essentially,
a well-functioning institution is required to align individual incentives towards the
social goal that it is designed to implement.
This specific property has a game-theoretic flavour. Indeed, from the imple-
mentation theoretic viewpoint, an institution is a game-theoretic device1. This
abstraction on one hand constitutes an enormous simplification on the nature of
an institution. On the other hand though it allows us to study the arising incentive
issues at a very fine level, while maintaining a very general environment2.
A typical implementation theoretic model consists of the following features:
1In most cases, a game form, which consists of a strategy space for each agent and an outcome
function mapping outcomes to strategy profiles.
2Even though more applied models exist as well.
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(i) A fixed set of agents, the participants of the society.
(ii) A fixed set of social outcomes. These represent the outcomes that are relevant
for the social decision.
(iii) A set of preference profiles, each one specifying for every agent a preference
ordering on the set of outcomes.
(iv) A social choice rule, that specifies for each preference profile, a set of outcomes
that are considered socially optimal.
The interpretation of the previous setting is as follows: A hypothetical social
planner, or the set of agents at an ex ante stage, desire to implement a social
choice rule, which depends on their actual preferences. The problem is that, the
social planner does not have that information, or equivalently, this information
is not publicly verifiable at a later stage. In addition, the social planner cannot
naively rely on the agents to truthfully reveal their preferences, as there might
be individual incentives to manipulate the social decision. Therefore, the social
planner has to design a game-theoretic device, which represents the institution,
such that, in the equilibrium of the game induced by the institution and the actual
preference profile, the socially optimal outcomes are realized.
From the previous narrative, two main research paths have been developed that
try to answer different questions and with varying degrees of generality. First, fix
an environment (agents, possible preference profiles and social choice rule). Now
consider a particular game-theoretic equilibrium concept. Are there any game
theoretic devices that can implement the desired rule in this solution concept?
What are their properties? The other direction which is more general takes a
step back and asks the following question: Fix an environment and a solution
concept, but not a social choice rule. What can a social planner implement in this
environment, with some game-theoretic device? In other words, what is the set of
implementable social choice rules?
Given these broad research agendas, a substantial literature has been devel-
oped3 that has significantly enhanced our understanding of institution design.
Nevertheless, new problems in implementation theory emerge, specifically on the
intersection with emerging fields such as Epistemic Game Theory, Behavioural
Economics, Cooperative Game Theory and Coalition Theory or Matching and
Market Design among others. It is these new advances that have inspired this
thesis.
In chapter 2, I shed some light on the intersection of implementation theory and
Behavioural Economics. Specifically, I examine the implementation of social choice
3I provide more in-depth literature reviews on specific strands of the literature in the individual
chapters.
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rules in strong equilibrium, when agents are partially honest, that is, when agents
prefer not to lie, when the welfare that they derive from the outcome is not at stake.
While this particular motive has been studied in other implementation concepts
such as Nash, undominated strategies, Bayesian etc., I outline the robustness of
partial honesty to stronger equilibrium concepts. Specifically, I show how the
sufficient conditions for strong implementation derived in Korpela (2013) can be
substantially weakened when agents adopt this weak honesty motive. I also provide
applications of my results in matching and bargaining environments, showing the
permissiveness of partial honesty in the implementation framework.
In chapter 3, I take a different approach to implementation. Specifically, I
follow the recent contribution of Koray and Yildiz (2018) in studying implemen-
tation with rights structures. In this way, contrary to the standard literature
where noncooperative game forms are utilized, the social planner allocates rights
to agents and coalitions, that allow them to change the status quo state, with the
specific details of the strategic interaction being left unspecified. The correspond-
ing implementation concept is cooperative game-theoretic in nature. Utilizing this
approach, I study implementation when there are two relevant sectors or social
issues, that is, the social choice rule assigns pairs of outcomes for each preference
profile, while the environment exhibits institutional constraints. First, I exam-
ine constrained conditional implementation, where the institution in one sector
is fixed and not an object of design. In this setting, the social planner has to
condition the rights structure of the designed sector to the fixed one, in order
to leverage incentives and implement the desired social choice rule. I provide a
complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules in this setting.
Second, I examine conditional implementation, where both sectors are objects of
design, but the planner is constrained to operate in a decentralized environment,
in that she has to design one institution that is decisive for each sectoral out-
come, with some (incomplete) communication taking place between them. In this
case I provide sufficient conditions for implementation. Applications of my results
include a matching environment with partners and projects and an environment
with lexicographic preferences.
In chapter 4, I return back to the issue of motives, but now from the rights
structure implementation viewpoint. I formulate partial honesty in a rights struc-
ture implementation theoretic framework, and I derive sufficient conditions for
implementation, when there exists at least a partially honest agent. The results in
this chapter compliment the rights structure approach, by providing an analogue
of the theorem by Dutta and Sen (2012) in this framework.
Due to the alternative thesis format, each chapter is written as a research paper
or note, with separate literature review, and is self-contained.
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Chapter 2
Strong implementation with
partially honest individuals
2.1 Introduction
Implementation theory studies the relationship between social goals and institu-
tions1. Specifically, it aims to examine the effect of institutional design to the
attainment of socially desirable outcomes. For example, suppose that a group of
people have agreed on the desirable social outcomes as a function of their prefer-
ences. How can they make sure that they can indeed obtain those outcomes, when
some or all of them may potentially benefit by misrepresenting their preferences?
They thus have to rely on designing an institution (in other words, mechanism or
game form) through which they will interact, that will ensure the optimality of
the outcomes reached through this interaction. More formally, for any collective
choice rule that assigns some socially optimal outcomes as a function of individual
preferences, implementation is achieved when, for any profile of preferences, the
set of socially optimal outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes attained in the
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism.
While most of the classic literature on the subject relies on the assumption that
agents have a purely consequentialist nature, that is, they only care about the final
outcomes, the strand of behavioural implementation theory typically assumes that
agents may also have procedural concerns. One recent subfield in particular, takes
into account the fact that agents may have an intrinsic preference for honesty.
This weak honesty motive is usually modelled in the following manner: Suppose
that an agent is indifferent between two outcomes. Then she will strictly prefer
to obtain an outcome with a truthful message rather than with an untruthful
1For a comprehensive survey of the main results in the literature of implementation theory
see Jackson (2001).
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one. This type of rationale is typically referred to as partial honesty or minimal
honesty and can be supported by the experimental findings of Hurkens and Kartik
(2009) for example, who show that subjects either are always honest, or tend to
lie only when they gain by doing so. Despite being rather weak, partial honesty is
shown to bear a significant positive effect for the set of implementable rules and
limitations imposed by Maskin-monotonicity2 in paticular. In their seminal paper,
Dutta and Sen (2012) show that in the presence of at least one partially honest
agent in the society, Maskin-monotonicity is no longer a necessary condition for
Nash implementation and No Veto Power alone becomes sufficient for three or
more agents.
Overall, the results on Nash implementation with partial honesty have been
positive. An important question that remains unanswered though is whether these
possibilities can be extended to other, possibly stronger, equilibrium concepts.
For example, in many situations, the social planner cannot exclude the possibility
of pre play communication between the agents and thus the mechanism may be
vulnerable to group deviations. In such settings the natural solution concept to
use is strong Nash equilibrium3 à la Aumann (1960), that is robust to deviations
by any possible coalition of agents.
The current paper identifies sufficient conditions for strong implementation
when all agents are partially honest. Instead of a full characterization, we chose
to follow the work of Korpela (2013) in providing simple sufficient conditions that
have a more intuitive appeal and are generally easier to check in applications.
First, we identify sufficient conditions for strong implementation when all agents
are partially honest and prove their sufficiency. Specifically, we show that if a social
choice rule satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Universally Worst Alterna-
tive (UWA) and Weak Pareto Dominance (WPD), then it can be implemented in
strong equilibrium. In this way we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela
(2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason (ASR). Our new condition, WPD
roughly requires the following to be true: if an outcome a is optimal at some state,
and if there exists another outcome b, such that all agents weakly prefer b to a with
at least one agent being indifferent between them, then b must be optimal as well.
WPD is implied by ASR, therefore our condition is weaker. Next, we provide two
applications of our results, in bargaining and pure matching environments. More
specifically, we show that the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) solution in a pure
matching environment as well as the Nash bargaining solution in a cake-cutting
2Maskin (1999) in his seminal paper identified a condition now known as Maskin-monotonicity
as necessary and almost sufficient for Nash implementation. It roughly says that if an optimal
outcome at some state does not fall in even one person’s ranking when switching to another
state, then it should still be selected as optimal. A formal definition will be given later.
3From now on we will use the terms strong equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium inter-
changably. The same applies for the respective implementation concepts.
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environment are both strongly implementable, when agents are partially honest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2, we review
the relevant literature. In section 2.3, we present the basic implementation setting
and formal definitions. In section 2.4, we provide the definitions of our conditions,
our main theorem and some additional results. Section 2.5 consists of our two
applications. Finally, in section 2.6 we conclude by discussing our results and
providing some points for further research. The proof of our main theorem is in
the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
The problem of strong implementation has primarily been studied by Maskin
(1979). Moulin and Peleg (1982) study strong implementation with the introduc-
tion of effectivity functions, that represent the power structure of the mechanism.
They show that there exists a class of strongly implementable social choice rules
that satisfy No Veto Power (NVP), beyond the Pareto correspondence, contrary
to what was initially proposed by Maskin (1979). A complete characterization of
strongly implementable social choice rules is due to Dutta and Sen (1991). Suh
(1996) generalizes the latter result by allowing the planner to possibly exclude
some coalition formation ex ante, so in this more general setting not all coalitions
are feasible. If the planner though cannot obtain such information, the relevant
implementation concept is double implementation in Nash and strong equilibrium.
Suh (1997) provides general results in this case as well. While complete charac-
terizations are of high theoretical significance, they can be hard to apply to more
specific settings. This motivates the more recent work by Korpela (2013) to iden-
tify simple sufficient conditions for strong implementation.
On the issue of partial honesty in implementation, the pioneering work of Dutta
and Sen (2012) shows that No Veto Power (NVP) alone becomes sufficient for Nash
implementation in the presence of at least one partially honest agent4. Their re-
sults are generalized by Lombardi and Yoshihara (2019), who provide a full char-
acterization of Nash implementable rules in the presence of partial honesty, for
both unanimous and non-unanimous social choice rules. In more applied settings,
Kartik et al. (2014) focus on environments with economic interest and identify suf-
ficient conditions for implementation in two rounds of iterative deletion of strictly
dominated strategies by “simple” mechanisms, without utilizing the usual canon-
ical mechanisms5. On restricted domains with private goods, Doghmi and Ziad
4In contrast with the case of no partial honesty, where NVP along with Maskin-monotonicity
are sufficient. The well-known result is due to Maskin (1999).
5Jackson (1992) criticizes the use of canonical mechanisms in implementation theory as too
permissive due to their unbounded strategy spaces. Instead, he derives a necessary condition
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(2013) provide more positive results for Nash implementation. In other solution
concepts with complete information, Saporiti (2014) shows that with partial hon-
esty strategy-proofness is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation, which
essentially requires implementation in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium.
Hagiwara (2019) also shows that NVP is sufficient with at least one, and unanimity
is sufficient with at least two partially honest agents for double implementation in
Nash and undominated Nash equilibria. Finally, the limitations of partial honesty
in Nash implementation are outlined in Lombardi and Yoshihara (2018) who ex-
plore under which conditions partially honest Nash implementation is equivalent
to Nash implementation, and in Adachi (2017).
Partial honesty can yield positive results in incomplete information environ-
ments as well. For example, Matsushima (2008) shows that incentive compatibility
is sufficient for implementation in strong iterative dominance and Korpela (2014)
proves that incentive compatibility and NVP are sufficient for implementation in
Bayes Nash equilibrium. Studies with alternative solution concepts include Ortner
(2015), who provides more positive results with partial honesty in fault-tolerant
Nash equilibrium6 and stochastically stable equilibrium.
The issue of implementation with partial honesty nevertheless can be put in
the broader context of implementation with motives, where it is typically assumed
that agents may also give significance to motives as procedural concerns, apart
from the final outcomes. Along this line of research, it is worth mentioning a con-
cept related to partial honesty, namely that of “social responsibility”. In Lombardi
and Yoshihara (2017), the effect of social responsibility is explored with regards
to natural implementation7. Hagiwara et al. (2017) utilize a similar concept of
social responsibility for strategy space reduction with an outcome mechanism for
Nash implementation. In a different environment, Doğan (2017) shows that the
unique socially optimal allocation of objects to agents can be Nash implemented,
when at least three agents have a social responsibility motive. Some general re-
sults on motives as tie-breaking rules with regards to Nash implementation are in
Kimya (2017). Other significant contributions to the literature of motives in im-
plementation include Glazer and Rubinstein (1998), Corchón and Herrero (2004)
and Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016).
for implementation with bounded mechanisms in undominated strategies. In the same context,
Mukherjee et al. (2017) provide a full characterization when all agents are partially honest.
6Fault-tolerant Nash equilibrium was first introduced in the implementation literature by
Eliaz (2002) as an equilibrium concept which is robust to the bounded rationality of a number
of agents.
7Specifically, they show that the Walrasian correspondence, although it violates Maskin-
monotonocity, can be implemented via a market-type mechanism, where agents announce prices
and consumption bundles. Like in the case of Kartik et al. (2014), no tail-chasing construction
is used.
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2.3 Preliminaries
Our society consists of a finite set of individuals N = {1, ..., n} with |N | = n ≥ 3.
By C ⊆ N we will denote a coalition of agents. The set of all possible social
outcomes is denoted by A and we typically assume that |A| ≥ 2. Each agent i
is endowed with a preference ordering (complete, reflexive and transitive binary
relation) over A that is denoted by Ri. We denote the set of all such possible
orderings for i by Ri and, as usual, by Pi and Ii we denote the asymmetric and
symmetric part of Ri respectively. Define R ≡ ×i∈NRi with a typical element
R = (R1, ..., Rn) which we call a preference profile or simply, state. For each i ∈ N
let Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aRib} be agent i’s lower contour set of outcome a in state
R. A social choice rule (SCR) f is a correspondence f : R ⇒ A such that for all
R ∈ R, ∅ 6= f(R) ⊆ A. A social choice function (SCF) is a single-valued SCR. For
any R ∈ R, we call f(R) the set of f -optimal outcomes in state R.
A mechanism G is a pair (S, g), which consists of a strategy space S = ×i∈NSi,
with Si being the set of available strategies for each i ∈ N , and an outcome function
g : S → A, that maps each strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S to an outcome in
A. As usual, let (s′i, s−i) be the strategy profile where agent i plays the strategy s
′
i
while all j 6= i play sj. In a similar manner, let (s′C , sN\{C}) be the strategy profile
where all i ∈ C play s′i, and all j ∈ N \ C play sj. We also define the range of a
mechanism G as g(S) = {a ∈ A|a = g(s) for some s ∈ S}. Now let Γ be the set of
all possible mechanisms, and Γ∗ = {G ∈ Γ|g(S) = A}, that is, Γ∗ is the set of all
mechanisms whose range is equal to the set of social outcomes. Any mechanism
G with a preference profile R define a normal form game (G,R). We focus on the
case of complete information where the state R is common knowledge among the
agents, while not to the planner.
In our setting, we assume that agents do not only care about the social out-
comes, but also give some importance (although small) to the procedure that leads
to those outcomes. More specifically, we assume that agents are partially honest
in the following sense: If an agent is indifferent between two outcomes and she
can attain those outcomes with two different strategies with one being “honest”
and the other being “dis-honest”, then she strongly prefers to follow the honest
strategy. More formally, for honesty to be meaningful in our setting, we should
restrict the set of possible mechanisms such that the strategy set of each i ∈ N
is Si = R ×Mi. That is, each agent is required to announce a preference profile
R ∈ R and an arbitrary message mi ∈ Mi. Then, given a mechanism G, for
any i ∈ N we define i’s truthful correspondence as TGi : R⇒ Si such that for each
agent i, state R and message mi, T
G
i (R) = {R}×Mi. The truthful correspondence
represents the truthful strategies for each agent i in state R, which essentially con-
sist of announcing the “true” state. We now define agent i’s extended preferences
on the strategy space S as follows. Given a vector of truthful correspondences
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TG = (TG1 , ..., T
G
n ), for all i ∈ N and R ∈ R, define Ri as a complete, transitive
and reflexive binary relation on S. An extended preference profile in state R is
denoted by R= (R1 , ...,Rn ). We are now ready to proceed to the formal defini-
tion of partial honesty.
Given a mechanism G, an agent i is partially honest if ∀si, s′i ∈ Si,∀s−i ∈ S−i:
• [si ∈ TGi (R), s′i /∈ TGi (R) and g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i)]⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i).
• In all other cases, g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) ⇐⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i)
An agent i is not partially honest if ∀si, s′i ∈ Si, ∀s−i ∈ S−i:
• g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) ⇐⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i)
In other words, an agent cares about honesty in a lexicographic manner: First
she “consults” her ordering over outcomes, and if she is indifferent between some,
she consults her ordering over strategies, strongly preferring the honest strategies
if they exist. That is, her partial honesty serves the purpose of a tie-breaking rule
when she faces indifference. On the other hand, an agent that is not partially
honest cares only about the outcomes and does not give any significance to her
strategies.
Notice that a mechanism G with an extended preference profile R in state R
define an (extended) game in normal form (G,R). Finally, we assume that in
our society there can be partially honest and not partially honest agents and we
denote the set of partially honest agents by H. For the planner however, we only
assume that he knows the class of all conceivable sets of partially honest agents,
H ⊆ 2N \ {∅}, without knowing which set is the actual one.
Regarding the solution concept, since we assume that players are allowed to
collude, the equilibrium notion that we use is strong equilibrium. Formally, s ∈ S
is a strong equilibrium in the game (S, g,R), if for all C ⊆ N and s′C ∈ SC ,
there exists an agent i ∈ C such that (sC , sN\C) Ri (s′C , sN\C). In other words, a
strategy profile is a strong equilibrium if there is no coalition that can deviate from
it and make all of its members strictly better off. Let the set of strong equilibria
of (S, g,R) be SE(G,R) = {s ∈ S|s is a strong equilibrium in (G,R)}. We
say that mechanism G implements the SCR f in strong equilibrium, if in any
state R ∈ R, g(SE(G,R)) = f(R), that is, if in any state, the set of outcomes
obtained through the strong equilibria of the extended game coincides with the
set of socially optimal outcomes. The SCR f is strongly implementable if there
exists a mechanism that implements it in strong equilibrium.
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The previous formal setting can be interpreted as follows. First of all, the SCR
represents the collective choice rule that our society utilizes in order to make collec-
tive decisions. It can also be interpreted as the constitution of the society designed
in an ex ante stage. A mechanism on the other hand represents the institution
through which the agents in the society interact with each other, that is, it deter-
mines the rules and the outcomes of the interaction. A hypothetical benevolent
social planner wishes to implement the SCR, however, he does not know the true
state, hence, he relies on the agents in order to obtain this information. On the
other hand, truthful revelation of the state may not be in the best interests of some
agents. Therefore, the goal of the social planner is to construct a mechanism that
will lead to the optimal according to the SCR outcome, for any realization of the
agents’ preferences, that is, for any preference profile. For the strong implemen-
tation of the SCR we thus require any optimal outcome to be attainable by some
strong equilibrium and any strong equilibrium to lead to an optimal outcome.
2.4 Results
In this section, we present our main results. Before proceeding though, it would be
helpful first to review the result of Korpela (2013). This will enable us to outline
more clearly the weakening of the sufficient conditions for strong implementation
when we adopt the partial honesty assumption. The conditions are the following:
Holocaust Alternative (HA): ∃aH ∈ A, such that:
• ∀R ∈ R, aH /∈ f(R), and,
• ∀R ∈ R,∀a ∈ A \ {aH}, a /∈ Li(aH , R).
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): ∀R ∈ R, f(R) ⊆ wPO(A,R), where
wPO(A,R) = {a ∈ A|@b ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N, bPia}.
Axiom of Sufficient Reason (ASR): ∀R,R′ ∈ R,∀a ∈ f(R),∀b ∈ A:
∀i ∈ N,Li(a,R) ⊆ Li(b, R′)⇒ b ∈ f(R′).
Intuitively, one can imagine HA as the worst alternative for all agents in any
state, that cannot ever be selected as an optimal outcome. It is a significant
restriction on the preference domain, however, it is meaningful in various appli-
cations. It essentially allows us to overcome more involved conditions such as
Condition γ of Dutta and Sen (1991). WPO restricts the range of the SCR to
weakly Pareto optimal outcomes. It is well-known from Maskin (1979) that weak
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Pareto optimality in the range of the mechanism is also a necessary condition for
strong implementation.
ASR can be interpreted as follows: Let an outcome a be selected as f -optimal
for some preference profile R. Now imagine an outcome b and profile R′ such that
for all agents, every outcome that was ranked weakly below a in R is also ranked
weakly below b in R′. Then, b should be f -optimal in R′. In other words, if every
reason for a to be f -optimal in R is also a reason for b to be f -optimal in R′, and
a is indeed selected as an optimal outcome in R, then b should be selected as an
optimal outcome in R′ as well. It is useful to note that ASR is stronger than
Maskin-monotonicity (MON) and Unanimity (U) as it implies both. We review
the formal definitions below:
Maskin-Monotonicity (MON): ∀R,R′ ∈ R,∀i ∈ N, ∀a ∈ f(R):
∀i ∈ N,Li(a,R) ⊆ Li(a,R′)⇒ a ∈ f(R′).
Unanimity (U): ∀R ∈ R, ∀a ∈ A:
∀i ∈ N,A ⊆ Li(a,R)⇒ a ∈ f(R).
For example, note that we obtain MON if in the definition of ASR we set
b = a. To see that it implies U, suppose that ASR holds, and for some state R
and outcome a we have that for all i, A ⊆ Li(a,R). Then, for any state R′ and
any outcome c ∈ f(R′) it trivially holds that for all i, Li(c, R′) ⊆ A ⊆ Li(a,R),
and from ASR, a ∈ f(R) is obtained. We are now ready to present Korpela’s
theorem:
Theorem 1 (Korpela, 2013). If a SCR f satisfies HA, WPO and ASR then it
is strongly implementable.
Theorem 1 makes no assumptions with regards to the partial honesty motive.
Its significance lies on the simplicity and intuitive appeal of the conditions. Now
proceeding to our results, we will utilize the following assumption that summarizes
the knowledge of the social planner with regards to the number of partially honest
agents in the society.
Assumption 1: All agents in N are partially honest and the planner knows that.
Assumption 1 has been extensively used in implementation problems. Ex-
amples include Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Korpela (2014), Matsushima (2008),
Mukherjee et al. (2017), Ortner (2015) and Saporiti (2014). As in the case of the
Dutta and Sen (2012) in Nash implementation, our goal is to examine the effect
of the presence of partially honest agents on the strong implementation problem.
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Moreover, we aim to determine whether partial honesty bears analogous signifi-
cant impact in the case of strong implementation as in Nash implementation, given
that the sufficient conditions for the former are much stronger than in the case of
the latter. In fact, by assuming that all agents are partially honest we manage
to derive sharp and significant results. For our first result, we identify sufficient
conditions for strong implementation when all agents are partially honest. Our
key condition is the following8:
Weak Pareto Dominance (WPD): ∀R ∈ R, ∀a ∈ f(R),∀b ∈ A, if:
• ∃j ∈ N, aIjb, and
• ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, bRia,
then b ∈ f(R).
The intuition behind our condition is the following: Suppose that a is an f -
optimal outcome at state R. Then, if there exists an outcome b such that everyone
weakly prefers b to a, with at least one agent being indifferent between them,
then b must be selected as f -optimal as well9. Another way to look at WPD
is as an “expansion” of the set of socially optimal outcomes in each state, so as
to include all unanimously weakly preferred, or indifferent outcomes. The latter
interpretation also has a strong normative appeal. Notice that WPD is implied
by ASR. To see this simply set R = R′ in the definition of ASR which makes
WPD true. Another interesting fact with regards to WPD is that together with
WPO, it implies U, which will prove to be particularly useful in our main result.
This is stated formally in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. If a SCR f satisfies WPO and WPD, then it satisfies U.
Proof. Consider a SCR f that satisfies both WPO and WPD. Also, consider a
state R ∈ R and an outcome a ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ A, aRib, so that the
premises of U are satisfied. If a ∈ f(R), then we are done. Suppose that this is
not the case. Then, since f(R) 6= ∅, there must exist an outcome c ∈ A such that
c ∈ f(R). Since ∀i ∈ N, ∀b ∈ A, aRib, we must have that aRic. Now suppose that
∀i ∈ N, aPic. This however cannot be the case as WPO is violated. Therefore,
there must exist an agent j ∈ N such that aIjc. However, for all i ∈ N \ {j}
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for motivating us to pursue a weakening of the
condition that we initially presented in our working paper.
9In general, we can exclude the possibility of a being strictly Pareto dominated by b by the
WPO condition which, apart from using it as part of our sufficient condition, we also show it
to be necessary for partially honest strong implementation in the range of the mechanism. See
Proposition 2.
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it holds that aRic. But then, WPD implies a ∈ f(R), a contradiction. This
completes the proof.
Next, we present the second part of our sufficient condition, a weakening of
HA, the Universally Worst Alternative. It is particularly useful as it is satisfied
in various interesting environments as shown in our applications section. We state
it formally below:
Universally Worst Alternative (UWA): ∃aW ∈ A, such that ∀R ∈ R,∀i ∈
N, ∀a ∈ f(R), aPiaW .
So, a UWA is strictly worse than any socially optimal outcome for any agent
and state and is never selected as socially optimal itself. It is easy to see that it
is implied by HA, as any HA is also a UWA10. Now, UWA, WPO and WPD
become sufficient for strong implementation when all agents are partially honest,
which is stated in our main theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If a SCR f satisfies UWA,
WPO, and WPD, then it is strongly implementable.
Proof. See apendix.
Regarding the proof, we utilize the mechanism of Korpela (2013). Each agent
is called to announce an outcome, a state, a positive integer and whether she raises
a flag or not. We essentially show that because of Assumption 1, there cannot be
any strong equilibria where an agent is announcing a state different from the true
one, as in such a case, due to the nature of the outcome function, there would
exist profitable deviations motivated by partial honesty. Then, we show that our
conditions are sufficient to guarantee that a socially optimal outcome is a strong
equilibrium and that any strong equilibrium leads to a socially optimal outcome.
Several points are worth noting in this particular theorem. First, WPD con-
stitutes a significant weakening of the ASR which reduces to a Pareto related
condition. This is quite interesting since we were able to dispose of MON, or any
variation of it from our sufficient conditions. In fact, we only utilise “intra-state”
conditions, that is, conditions that restrict the socially optimal set with regards to
the same state, rather than “inter-state” ones. The second point to note is that
WPO is also a necessary condition for partially honest strong implementation,
given that the range of the mechanism coincides with the set of alternatives11. We
formally prove the statement in Proposition 2 below. Finally, notice that if we
10For other uses of UWA see Moore and Repullo (1990), or Jackson et al. (1994).
11This assumption is crucial for the necessity of WPO.
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only allow for linear orderings12, WPD holds trivially (Proposition 3) and it be-
comes redundant as a sufficient condition. Below we provide the formal statements
and appropriate proofs and in Corollary 1 we state a characterization theorem of
strongly implementable SCRs for the case of linear preferences when agents are
partially honest.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and f be strongly implementable by a
mechanism G ∈ Γ∗. Then f satisfies WPO.
Proof. Let the premises hold. To derive a contradiction, suppose that f does not
satisfy WPO. This implies that for some R ∈ R, there exists a ∈ f(R) such that
a /∈ wPO(A,R). So, there must exist b ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N, bPia. Now, since
f is strongly implementable, there exists a strong equilibrium s ∈ S such that
g(s) = a. So, ∀C ⊆ N,∀s′C ∈ SC , ∃j ∈ C, (sC , sN\C) Rj (s′C , sN\C). Since G ∈ Γ∗,
we are allowed to consider C = N and g(s′) = b. Then, we have that s Rj s′ and
for j it holds that:
• s ∼Rj s′ (1), or
• s Rj s′ (2)
If (1) holds, then g(s) = aIjb = g(s
′), but also bPja, a contradiction. If (2)
holds, we have either g(s) = aPjb = g(s
′) and bPja, a contradiction, or a =
g(s)Ijg(s
′), si ∈ TGj (R) and s′i /∈ TGj (R) which also contradicts bPja. So, our
initial statement that f does not satisfy WPO cannot hold. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 3. If RA = L, then any SCR f satisfies WPD.
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward, as one can notice that if there
exists an agent that is indifferent between a socially optimal alternative a and an
outcome b, as dictated in the premise of WPD, then, by the linear preference
assumption, a must be equal to b and the condition holds vacuously. We are now
ready to proceed with our Corollary:
Corollary 1. Let RA = L and Assumption 1 hold. If a SCR f satisfies UWA,
then it is strongly implementable by a mechanism G ∈ Γ∗ if and only if it satisfies
WPO.
Proof. Immediate implication of Theorem 2 and Propositions 2 and 3.
12Formally, let Li be the set of all linear, that is, complete, transitive and antisymmetric,
orders on A for each agent i and let L ≡ ×i∈NLi. Let the space of admissible preferences be
RA. So, in this case we set RA = L.
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Corollary 1 provides a characterization of the strongly implementable social
choice rules with linear preferences, when there exists a UWA and all agents
are partially honest. Essentially, in this case WPO is a necessary and sufficient
condition for strong implementation13.
2.5 Applications
In this section we provide applications of our Theorem 2. Our first application is in
pure matching environments, that is, one-to-one matching environments where for
every agent, staying unmatched is not feasible, or it is the worst possible alternative
in any state. For example, a manager in a firm might want to match people from
two groups with different abilities in pairs, in order to undertake projects. In this
case it might be reasonable to assume that staying unmatched is not feasible (as it
might lead to redundancies). We show that when all agents are partially honest,
the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) stable solution is strongly implementable.
This is to be compared with the results of Tadenuma and Toda (1998), who show
that with more than three agents in each group, while the whole stable solution
in pure matching problems is Nash implementable, no single-valued subsolution of
it is. Lombardi and Yoshihara (2019) show that partial honesty can resolve this
issue for Nash implementation, as the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) solution
become Nash implementable in this case. With regards to strong implementation,
Shin and Suh (1996) present a mechanism for strong implementation of the stable
rule in one-to-one matching problems and the implementability of the stable rule
in pure marriage problems is shown in Korpela (2013).
Our second application is in bargaining environments. We show that when
all agents are partially honest, the Nash bargaining solution is strongly imple-
mentable. In general, it is known that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash
implementable, due to the result by Vartiainen (2007a). However, Lombardi and
Yoshihara (2019) again show that it can be implemented with partial honesty. Our
results extend theirs to the strong equilibrium concept.
2.5.1 Pure Matching Environments
We start by defining the formal pure matching environment. Let M,W be two
fixed finite sets, such that |M | = |W | ≥ 2 and M ∩W = ∅. For all i ∈ M , Pi is
a linear order on W ∪ {i}, and for all i ∈ W , Pi is a linear order on M ∪ {i}. A
matching is a function µ : M ∪W → M ∪W such that for any i ∈M ∪W the
following hold:
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to the possibility of this characterization
theorem.
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• i ∈M & µ(i) 6= i⇒ µ(i) ∈ W ,
• i ∈ W & µ(i) 6= i⇒ µ(i) ∈M , and
• µ(µ(i)) = i.
LetM be the set of all matchings. We now extend the relation Pi toM by defining
a new relation Ri as follows:
∀i ∈M ∪W, ∀µ, µ′ ∈M, µRiµ′ ⇐⇒ µ(i)Piµ′(i) or µ(i) = µ′(i)
Let the set of all preferences over M of each agent i be Ri. We then define
R ≡ ×i∈M∪WRi. As usual, R ∈ R denotes a preference profile. Now we make the
following assumption, which makes our environment one of pure matching:
Assumption 2: ∀m ∈M, ∀w ∈ W,∀µ ∈M, wPmm & mPww.
A solution (or SCR) is a correspondence ϕ : R ⇒ M such that for all
R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊆ M. A pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W blocks µ ∈ M in R ∈ R if
wPmµ(m) and mPwµ(w). A matching µ ∈ M is stable in R ∈ R, if there is
no pair (m,w) ∈M ×W such that (m,w) blocks µ in R. Let S(R) be the set of
all stable matchings in R ∈ R. The stable matching rule is a rule fS : R ⇒M
such that for every R ∈ R, fS(R) = S(R). We say that µM ∈ M is the man-
optimal stable matching in state R ∈ R if µM ∈ S(R) and for every µ′ ∈ S(R) and
m ∈M , we have that µM(m)Pmµ′(m), or µM(m) = µ′(m). The man-optimal sta-
ble rule fM is a function fM : R →M such that for every R ∈ R, f(R) = µM . In
a similar manner, we can define the woman-optimal stable matching and rule. We
now proceed by stating our possibility result for the pure matching environment.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the man-optimal stable
rule fM is strongly implementable.
Proof. It suffices to show that fM satisfies UWA, WPO and WPD,
Claim 1: fM satisfies UWA.
Proof. By the construction of the pure matching environment, we have assumed
that staying single is the worst alternative for every i ∈ M ∪W . So, we can set
aW = µW , where for all i ∈M ∪W , µW (i) = i. So, our environment satisfies
UWA 14.
Claim 2: fM satisfies WPO.
14The pure matching environment actually satisfies the stronger condition HA as shown in
Korpela (2013).
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Proof. Suppose not. Consider R ∈ R such that µ = fM(R) and suppose there
exists µ′ ∈ M with µ′ 6= µ such that ∀i ∈M ∪W,µ′(i)Piµ(i). Then, there exists
(m,w) ∈ M ×W such that µ′(m) = w 6= µ(m) and µ′(w) = m 6= µ(w). Conse-
quently, the pair (m,w) would block matching µ, which contradicts its stability.
Therefore, fM satisfies WPO.
Claim 3: fM satisfies WPD.
Proof. Consider R ∈ R and let fM(R) = µM . Now suppose there exists µ ∈ M
such that:
• ∃j ∈ N,µMIjµ, and
• ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, µRiµM
Since the man-optimal stable rule fM is a function, it suffices to show that µ = µM .
Now, without loss of generality let j = m ∈M . For m it holds that µImµM , which
implies µ(m) = µM(m). Let µ(m) = w. Then necessarily it must be the case
that µ(w) = µM(w) and thus µIwµ
M . Now if for all i ∈ M ∪ W \ {m,w} it
also holds that µ(i) = µM(i), then µ = µM and we are done. Suppose that this
is not the case. So, there exists i ∈ M ∪W \ {m,w} such that µ(i) 6= µM(i).
Again, without loss of generality, assume that i = m′ ∈M . Then, it must be that
µ(m′)Pm′µ
M(m′). Let µ(m′) = w′. Now, for w′ it is also true that m′Pw′µ
M(w′).
However, this contradicts the stability of the man-optimal stable matching µM ,
as the couple (m′, w′) would block it. Therefore, we conclude that µ = µM and
WPD holds.
By Claims 1, 2, 3 and Theorem 2, we have that the man-optimal stable solution
is strongly implementable. This completes the proof.
2.5.2 Bargaining Environments
For the definition of the bargaining environment we chose to follow the work of
Vartiainen (2007a), to whom we refer for the detailed formulation. Let N =
{1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players. The set of outcomes is A = {(a1, ..., an) ∈
Rn+|
∑n
i=1 ai ≤ 1}. Let the set of possible types of each agent i ∈ N be Θ. For each
θi ∈ Θ, vi(·, θi) : [0, 1] → R is agent i’s strictly monotonic and continuous utility
function. Let Θ0 be the normalized set of types for each i such that Θ0 = {θi ∈
Θ|vi(0, θi) = 0}. Let ∆ be the set of all probability distributions on A. So, for any
outcome p ∈ ∆ and agent i ∈ N , vi(p, θ) =
∫
A
vi(ai, θi)dp(a) is the utility function
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of i defined on ∆. We also set the disagreement points d = 0. The Nash solution is
a SCR fN : Θn0 ⇒ ∆ such that ∀θ ∈ Θn0 , fN(θ) = argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). Notice
that our environment satisfies UWA, since we have assumed strictly monotonic
utility functions and in any Nash solution all agents get positive amounts of the
good. This allows us to set aW = d = 0.
Proposition 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the Nash solution fN is strongly
implementable.
Proof. Since the Nash solution satisfies weak Pareto optimality by definition, and
our environment satisfies UWA, it suffices to show only that fN satisfies WPD.
Claim 4: fN satisfies WPD.
Proof. Consider θ ∈ Θn0 such that p ∈ fN(θ). Now, let q ∈ ∆ be such that
∃j ∈ N, vj(q, θj) = vj(p, θj) and ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, vi(q, θi) ≥ vi(p, θi). If q = p, then
we are done. Suppose that q 6= p. If now for all i ∈ N \ {j} it is also the case that
vi(q, θi) = vi(p, θi), then it must be that q ∈argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). Assume then
that there exists an i ∈ N \ {j} such that vi(q, θi) > vi(p, θi). But this contradicts
that p ∈ argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). So, it is true that fN satisfies WPD.
By Claim 4, Theorem 2 and the fact that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies
UWA and WPO, we conclude that it is strongly implementable. This completes
the proof.
We have shown that the Nash solution satisfies our sufficient conditions and
is thus strongly implementable when all agents are partially honest. For this
result we relied on the ordinality of the environment. Note for example that U
is not satisfied by the egalitarian solution in an environment where interpersonal
comparisons are allowed, preferences are not strictly monotone and there is more
than one good15. This implies that our Theorem 2 cannot be applied in this case.
2.6 Concluding remarks
We have provided a sufficiency theorem for strong implementation when all agents
are partially honest. Our goal was to extend the positive results that have been
obtained in partially honest Nash implementation to the solution concept of strong
equilibrium. Our sufficient conditions are much stronger than in the case of Nash
implementation and this is due to the much more demanding solution concept, as
well as due to the attempt to provide simple sufficient conditions rather than a
complete characterization.
15For studies in bargaining theory in this type of environment see Roemer (1988).
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As applications of our main theorem, we showed that the man-optimal (or
woman-optimal) stable rule in a pure matching environment as well as the Nash
solution in a bargaining environment with strictly monotone preferences are both
strongly implementable when all agents are partially honest. However, as noted
before, both these rules are not strongly implementable when there are no partially
honest agents, therefore our results show the expansion of strongly implementable
rules when the motive of minimal honesty is assumed.
In our view, the applications of our theorems provide an insight into the pos-
sibilities that arise in implementation theory when non-consequentialist motives
are taken into account. They also emphasize the importance of procedural con-
cerns in mechanism design and social choice theory. An interesting problem for
further research which we aim to tackle, is closing the gap between our necessary
and suffficient conditions. In fact, the Non-emptiness condition of Dutta and Sen
(1991) is necessary in our case as well and we conjecture that it could constitute
part of a sufficient condition, given that the mechanism is appropriately modified.
In that way, the domain restriction of UWA could be avoided and more clear-cut
results could be obtained. Finally, along the same line, it would be intriguing to
study under which conditions partially honest strong implementation is equivalent
to strong implementation.
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Appendix
Mechanism
For the proof of Theorem 2 we will utilize the following mechanism G = (S, g):
For all i ∈ N , Si = A×R×{NF,F}×N+. The outcome function g is defined as
follows:
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1) If ∀i ∈ N, si = (a,R,NF, ·) and a ∈ f(R), then g(s) = a.
2) If ∃C ⊂ N, ∀i ∈ N \ C, si = (a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R), and ∀j ∈ C, sj =
(aj, Rj, F, nj), then:
• If k = min{argmaxj∈Cnj} and ak ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R), then g(s) = ak
• Otherwise, g(s) = a
3) If ∀i ∈ N, si = (ai, Ri, F, ni), then k = min{argmaxj∈Nnj} and set g(s) = ak.
4) If none of the above apply, set g(s) = aW .
Proof of Theorem 2
We will show that any SCR f that satisfies our premises, namely UWA, WPO
and WPD can be implemented by mechanism G and we break the proof into two
parts:
Part 1: ∀R ∈ R, f(R) ⊆ SE(R)
Let the true state be R∗. Consider the strategy profile where ∀i ∈ N, si =
(a,R∗, NF, ·) and a ∈ f(R∗). If j ∈ N deviates to rule 2 she will obtain any
b ∈ Lj(a,R∗). So, g(Sj, sN\{j}) = Lj(a,R∗). If any C ⊂ N deviates to rule 2, the
obtained outcome will be in Lj(a,R
∗) for at least one j ∈ C. If N deviate to rule
3, there cannot be an improvement for all i ∈ N since f satisfies WPO. Finally,
there is no profitable deviation by any coalition to rule 4, since, by definition of
the UWA, aW is ranked strictly worse to any socially optimal outcome, by all
agents. Therefore, s is a strong equilibrium in R∗.
Part 2: ∀R ∈ R, SE(R) ⊆ f(R)
Let the true state be R∗. We proceed by first proving three useful claims:
Claim 1∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 1 where ∀i ∈ N,Ri 6= R∗.
Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 1, where ∀i ∈ N, si =
(a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R) and R 6= R∗. By rule 1 the outcome is a. Then,
∀i ∈ N, si /∈ TGi (R∗), so, any i ∈ N can deviate to s′i = (a,R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗)
inducing rule 2 while announcing the true state and not changing the outcome.
Therefore, s cannot be a strong equilibrium.
Claim 2∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ N \ C such
that Ri 6= R∗.
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Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ N\C, si =
(a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R), R 6= R∗, and ∀j ∈ C, sj = (aj, Rj, F, nj) and let
g(s) = b. Then, we have that si /∈ TGi (R∗). We break the proof into two cases:
Case 1: |N \ C| ≥ 2
• If b = a: Then, since by definition a ∈ Li(a,R) holds, i can play s′i =
(a,R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high integer without changing the
outcome and become strictly better off by Rule 2.
• If b 6= a: Then, again, since b ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R) it must hold that b ∈
∪j∈C∪{i}Li(a,R), so agent i can play s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a
sufficiently high integer without changing the outcome and become strictly
better off by Rule 2.
Case 2: N \ C = {i}
In this case i can play s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high integer
without changing the outcome and become strictly better off by Rule 3.
Therefore, there is no strong equilibrium under rule 2, where for some i ∈
N \ C,Ri 6= R∗.
Claim 3∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ C, withRi 6= R∗.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case, that is, there exists a strong equilibrium under
rule 2 such that ∃i ∈ C, with Ri 6= R∗. Also, by Claim 2∗, we have established
that in any strong equilibrium that falls in Rule 2, ∀j ∈ N \ C,Rj = R∗. So,
we consider a case where ∀j ∈ N \ C, sj = (a,R∗, NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R∗) and
∀k ∈ C, sk = (ak, Rk, F, nk) such that Rk 6= R∗ for some i ∈ C, that is, ∃i ∈ C
such that si /∈ TGi (R∗). Moreover, let g(s) = b. Now we take two mutually
exclusive cases:
Case 1: |C| ≥ 2
• If b = a, then, since we have that a ∈ Li(a,R∗) by definition, agent i can
play s′i = (a,R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high ni inducing rule 2
without changing the outcome and becoming strictly better off.
• If b = al 6= a, where l = min{argmaxj∈Cnj}, we distinguish two cases:
– l 6= i: In this case, since al ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), agent i can deviate to
s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗), win the integer game for a sufficiently high
integer without affecting the outcome, and thus become better off by
rule 2.
– l = i: Again, al ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), so i can play s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈
TGi (R
∗) and again become better off by rule 2.
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Case 2: C = {i}.
• If b = a, then i can deviate to s′i = (a,R∗, NF, ·) ∈ TGi (R∗) inducing Rule 1
and become better off by announcing the truth.
• If b 6= a, then it must be that b = ai. So, since b ∈ Li(a,R∗), i can revert to
truth-telling by playing s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) and become better off
by rule 2.
Therefore, there is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ C such that
Ri 6= R∗.
Claim 4∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 3 where ∃i ∈ N , with Ri 6=
R∗.
Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 3 where ∀j ∈ N, sj =
(aj, Rj, F, nj), g(s) = b and let Ri 6= R∗ for some i ∈ N , that is, ∃i ∈ N such that
si /∈ TGi (R∗). Then, i can deviate to s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) and obtain b
while announcing the true state R∗, for a sufficiently high integer ni. Therefore, s
cannot be a strong equilibrium.
Claim 5∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 4.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exists one, namely s ∈ S, with g(s) =
aW . So, ∀C ⊆ N,∀s′C ∈ SC ,∃i ∈ C, (sC , sN\C) R
∗
i (s
′
C , sN\C). Consider the case
where C = N and let g(s′) = a ∈ f(R∗). Then, there exists i ∈ N such that:
• (sC , sN\C) Ri (s′C , sN\C) (1), or
• (sC , sN\C) ∼Ri (s′C , sN\C) (2).
Suppose (1) holds. Then, either g(s) = aWPia = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗), which is a
contradiction of UWA, or g(s) = aW I
∗
i a = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗), si ∈ TGi (R∗) and
s′i /∈ TGi (R∗), where we have a contradiction as well. If (2) holds, then g(s) =
aW I
∗
i a = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗) and the same contradiction emerges. So, there is no strong
equilibrium under rule 4 and this completes the proof.
Corollary 2. Any strong equilibrium s of the mechanism G, falls under rules 1-3
and it also holds that ∀i ∈ N,Ri = R∗.
Proof. Immediate implication of Claims 1∗-5∗.
By the above arguments, we can restrict attention to strong equilibria under rules
1, 2 or 3, where ∀i ∈ N,Ri = R∗. Consider a strong equilibrium under rule:
1. That is, ∀i ∈ N, si = (a,R∗, NF, ·). Then g(s) = a ∈ f(R∗).
33
2. That is, ∀i ∈ N \ C, si = (a,R∗, F, ·) with a ∈ f(R∗), and ∀j ∈ C, sj =
(aj, R∗, F, nj). Let g(s) = b. We distinguish two cases:
|N\C| ≥ 2: Then, it must be that ∀i ∈ N\C, g(Si, sN\{i}) = ∪j∈C∪{i}Lj(a,R∗)
and ∀j ∈ C, g(Sj, sN\{j}) = ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), from Rule 2. For s to be a strong
equilibrium, it must hold that ∀i ∈ N \ C,Li(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈C∪{i}Lj(a,R∗) ⊆
Li(b, R
∗) and, ∀j ∈ C,Lj(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) ⊆ Lj(b, R∗). So, for any
i ∈ N we have that Li(a,R∗) ⊆ Li(b, R∗). However, since a ∈ f(R∗), from
WPO, it cannot be the case that ∀i ∈ N, bP ∗i a. So there must exist j ∈ N
such that aI∗j b. From WPD it follows that b ∈ f(R∗).
N \C = {i}: Then, for i it must hold that g(Si, sN\{i}) = A from rule 3, and
∀j ∈ C it must hold that g(Sj, sN\{j}) = ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) by rule 2. For s to be
a strong equilibrium, it must hold that ∀i ∈ N \ C,Li(a,R∗) ⊆ A ⊆ Li(b, R∗)
and ∀j ∈ C,Lj(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) ⊆ Lj(b, R∗). So for all i ∈ N it
holds that Li(a,R
∗) ⊆ Li(b, R∗). As before, from WPO and the fact that
a ∈ f(R∗), there must exist j ∈ N such that aI∗j b. Again, from WPD we
must have that b ∈ f(R∗).
3. That is, si = (a
i, R∗, F, ni), ∀i ∈ N and let g(s) = b. Then, ∀i ∈ N , it must
hold that g(Si, sN\{i}) = A. Now, for s to be a strong equilibrium it must be
that ∀i ∈ N,A ⊆ Li(b, R∗). Then, from WPO, WPD and Proposition 1, it
must hold that b ∈ f(R∗).
This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
Conditional rights and
implementation
3.1 Introduction
Decentralized systems are prevalent in modern societies, from governance and
administration, to markets and provision. It is now widely recognized at least
since the work of Hayek, that decentralization allows for more efficient use of
information that is dispersed across the economy. His analysis in Hayek (1980) has
shaped economic thought by providing a theoretic foundation for decentralization
against central planning. Nevertheless, the performance of decentralized systems
in realizing collective goals by providing appropriate individual incentives is not
always clear.
The motivation for this study comes from the fact that in many real-life cases,
decentralization is not a matter of design or choice for a social planner. Arguments
in favour of decentralization such as informational processing constraints, account-
ability, or balance of power, dictate that economic design has to work around that
fact, by taking it as a constraint. For example, when a government designs a
scheme for the provision of a public good, it has to take the private goods markets
as given. In other instances, such as when a new academic institution is estab-
lished, informational constraints might dictate that the allocation of instructors
and GTAs (Graduate Teaching Assistants) to courses should be handled by differ-
ent administrative departments. Similarly, in a collective bargaining agreement,
for tractability, the issue of wages and the issue of work conditions may be han-
dled by different bargaining councils and procedures. Finally, in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), negotiations take place by subject.
On the other hand, society’s goals might be concerned with the overall fairness,
efficiency, etc. When a government runs procurement auctions for public projects,
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overall fairness may be compromised, if a firm acquires all projects. In other
words, from a welfare perspective, the social choice might not be independent
across sectors.
The problem becomes even more interesting given that agents may in gen-
eral have non-separable preferences over sectoral outcomes. To give an example,
imagine a university where each course must be allocated to an instructor/tutor
pair. Instructors have preferences over pairs of courses and tutors, and tutors have
preferences over pairs of courses and instructors. Suppose that tutor w is very ex-
perienced in course h, but is totally incompetent in assisting with course h̄, while
tutor w̄ is an overall decent tutor in both courses. Then, the preferences of an
instructor m could be represented as:
(w, h) m (w̄, h̄) m (w̄, h) m (w, h̄)
Of course, these preferences are not separable, as the ranking of w and w̄ de-
pends on the choice of the course. Similarly, in the procurement auction example,
firms may have complementarities in their preferences on public projects, due to
economies of scale.
To give an intuition of our model and the questions that we attempt to answer,
consider the above scenario with the instructor/tutor pair. Now suppose that
different administrative departments have to be responsible for the allocation of
tutors and instructors to courses respectively. A relevant question that we answer
later in this paper is, can the university design such decentralized institutions, but
at same time achieve overall stability, that is, reach a matching where no pair of
instructor/tutor can block?
Naturally, in our model we consider two sectors and we ask two questions:
First, suppose that one of these two institutions, say sector 2, is fixed, that is, we
consider it an institutional constraint. Can we design the institution in sector 1
by taking into account sector 2 such that we implement the desirable outcomes
in both sectors, and which rules are implementable in this case? This is relevant
when the institution in the fixed sector represents some inalienable rights or some
power distribution that the designer cannot affect.
Our first exercise provides a good understanding of the problem of condition-
ality in institution design. Therefore, for our second question, we are able to push
the concept even further. In this case the social planner has to operate in a de-
centralized environment, which implies the existence of different institutions that
deal with different issues. Therefore, she has to design two institutions conditional
on each other. Moreover, each institution is decisive on its respective sectoral out-
come. This case is relevant when decentralization is simply given, or desirable for
other reasons, such as informational efficiency and accountability. We ask which
rules are implementable in this manner and implicitly show the difficulties that
arise in such case.
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In order to answer these questions, we utilize the notion of rights structures,
introduced by Koray and Yildiz (2018) to formalize the idea of an institution. In
this setting, the social planner endows agents or coalitions with rights over chang-
ing the state. In particular, she designs three objects: (i) a state space, which
provides the conditionals on which rights are tailored upon, (ii) an effectivity cor-
respondence, that specifies, for any possible ordered pair of states, the family of
coalitions that have the right to change the state from one to the other, and finally,
(iii) an outcome function, which maps states to outcomes. The interpretation of
the setting is that a hypothetical social planner wishes to implement a particular
social choice rule (SCR) that assigns a set of socially optimal outcomes to any
possible preference profile of the agents. However, she does not know the true
preference profile. Thus, she has to design a rights structure that will implement
the desired SCR. As usual, implementation is achieved when all outcomes real-
ized in equilibrium are socially optimal, and all socially optimal outcomes can be
realized through some equilibrium.
The equilibrium concept that we use for all of our results is a generalization
of the γ-equilibrium1 to the two-sector environment. Roughly speaking, a state is
a γ-equilibrium if any coalition that has an incentive to change the state (in any
one, or in both sectors “simultaneously”) does not have the power to do so and
vice versa, any coalition that has the right to change the state would not benefit
from this change.
Implementation with rights structures possesses various appealing properties.
First, it can be considered as a natural way of abstracting away the complex in-
teractions that occur in a society, and focus on the most significant aspects, while
at the same time, it bears a straightforward analogue to the exercise of rights in
the real world. Second, in some cases it is difficult or even impossible for the plan-
ner to specifically plan in advance for any possible strategy that the agents may
choose to play in a noncooperative mechanism. This is highly important when the
constitutional power of the planner over the agents is limited. In these settings,
rights structures deal with these shortcomings in a natural manner by allowing for
cooperative game-theoretic solutions, where the details of the interaction among
agents are left unspecified. Finally, implementation with rights does not utilize
classic implementation devices such as integer or modulo games that have unnat-
ural characteristics, and allows for neat characterizations that outline the essence
of the implementation problem.
A crucial aspect of our model is intersectoral communication between insti-
tutions. In order to formalize it, we introduce the notion of conditional rights
structures. The idea is to condition one sector’s effectivity correspondence and/or
1Korpela (2013) refer to this solution concept as core-equilibrium, as it is very similar to the
solution concept of the core.
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outcome function to features of the other sector. The interpretation is that, a coali-
tion’s effectiveness to change the state in a particular sector is also conditional on
the current state in the other sector. The idea is quite natural. For example,
one’s ability to exercise their right for welfare benefits depends on whether they
are already employed and vice versa. The implications of the intersectoral com-
munication on our model are substantial. On one hand, we are able to escape the
inevitable decomposability of the social choice rule as in Hayashi and Lombardi
(2017). On the other hand, given the incomplete nature of this communication,
our results outline the restrictiveness of decentralization, especially when the social
choice in one sector is not independent of the social choice in the other. Neverthe-
less, we feel that our approach provides a natural foundation for conditionality in
constitution design.
To answer our first question when one institution is fixed, we fully characterize
the social choice rules that are constrained conditionally implementable, given a
fixed rights structure in sector 2. Our characterization consists of two conditions
which are together necessary and sufficient. The first one, condition E bears a
twofold role: First, it guarantees that the fixed rights structure is well-behaved,
while ensuring the existence of suitable punishment-outcomes in sector 1 for pos-
sible deviations in sector 2. Second, it incorporates a constrained-monotonicity
condition, similar to the one in Hayashi and Lombardi (2019). It is essentially
a variation of the well-known Maskin-monotonicity2 that takes into account the
outcomes for which coalitions are effective for in sector 2. Our second condition,
constrained unanimity, is a variant of the usual unanimity condition in the same
manner. Therefore, our results are immediately comparable to Korpela et al.
(2018), as we provide “constrained” versions of their conditions.
Our second task we answer by studying conditional implementation. We pro-
vide a condition called projection-monotonicity which is necessary. It is weaker
than Maskin-monotonicity, as it requires an outcome to remain socially optimal,
when there is no preference reversal between it and any other outcome that can be
constructed as combination from the projections of the lower contour sets. This
outlines the difficulties that decentralization poses on the implementation prob-
lem. We then proceed by providing simple sufficient conditions for conditional
implementation under a domain restriction.
As application of constrained conditional implementation, we consider a match-
ing environment, where matching occurs in triplets between a set of managers, a
set of workers and a set of projects. We assume that the sector where projects are
assigned to workers is fixed and show that, under some natural assumptions, the
2Maskin-monotonicity is due to the seminal study of Maskin (1999). It roughly says that if an
outcome x is selected as socially optimal in a preference profile R, but not in R′, then there must
have been a preference reversal for at least one agent between x and some other outcome in R′.
Maskin-monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for implementation in Nash equilibrium.
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social planner can indeed overcome this constraint and implement the stable rule,
when managers are the “owners” of the projects. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study of implementability in such environment. Our application of
conditional implementation is a multi-issue environment with lexicographic pref-
erences. We show that the rule that assigns the weakly Pareto efficient outcomes
can be conditionally implemented.
The contribution of this paper boils down to two issues: First, we extend the
recent literature on decentralized mechanism design by incorporating cooperative
implementation concepts, such as rights structures. Apart from extending the
notion of γ-equilibrium to a two-sector setting, our rights structure approach nat-
urally describes the exercise of conditional and unconditional rights in the real
world. Secondly and most importantly, by utilizing rights structures, we study
the new problem of conditional implementation, where the planner is forced to
design one institution for each issue, and not a centralized institution to deal with
all issues “simultaneously”. We show that some of the difficulties of constrained
implementation persist even in this case, as it is not a lot more permissive. Our
results are complimented with examples and applications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2 we provide
a review of the relevant literature, in section 3.3 we present the formal environ-
ment and the basic definitions and in section 3.4 we present our conditions and
implementation results. In section 3.5 we present our applications and in section
3.6 we discuss our results and conclude. The proofs of the main theorems are in
the appendix.
3.2 Literature
Decentralization has been studied extensively in the mechanism design literature.
For an in-depth literature review we refer to Mookherjee (2006). Even in the
abstract implementation theory framework though, decentralization is not a new
issue. Since its very infant stage, implementation theory has been used as a formal
way to study institutions and the comparison of different economic systems. We
distinguish two main strands:
Direct vs indirect game forms: According to this early literature, a central-
ized institution is represented by a direct game form, where agents communicate
only their information to the central authority. An early but powerful result es-
tablished independently by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) implies that
no non-trivial social choice rule can be implemented by a direct game form in a
strategy-proof manner. A reaction to this negative result was the relaxation of the
manipulation desiderata. Maskin (1999) established some positive results on what
is now well-known as Nash implementation of social choice correspondences with
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an indirect game form, which can be interpreted as a decentralized institution,
where agents’ messages are more complex and arbitrary. While some positive re-
sults in strategy-proofness have been recovered for restricted preference domains,
in general domains Nash implementation has produced some remarkably powerful
and general theorems. Even though it is out of the scope of this paper to survey
the entire literature on implementation with indirect game forms3, we mention
some important contributions: Maskin (1999) and Moore and Repullo (1990) for
Nash implementation, Abreu and Sen (1990) and Vartiainen (2007b) for subgame
perfect implementation, and Mezzetti and Renou (2017) for repeated Nash im-
plementation. For incomplete information environments, see Jackson (1991) for
example.
Multiple issues/sectors: Another relatively more recent way in which de-
centralization appears in implementation theory is through the issue of multiple
sectors. Decentralization in this case manifests in the existence of several institu-
tions that deal with different social or economic issues, rather than a centralized
institution dealing with all issues. A seminal contribution along this line of research
is Breton and Sen (1999) who study strategy-proofness in a multi-issue environ-
ment. They show that with separable strict preferences and a sufficiently rich
domain, strategy-proof social choice functions must essentially be decomposable.
In a more recent contribution, Hayashi and Lombardi (2017) study whether the
usual partial equilibrium analysis that is prevalent in the economic design litera-
ture is innocuous. They show that in the presence of multiple sectors that can only
conceive of separable preferences and no intersectoral communication, the possibil-
ities for implementation are limited. In Hayashi and Lombardi (2019), the paper
most closely to ours, the issue of implementation with institutional constraints
is studied with the use of noncooperative game forms. Our constrained condi-
tional implementation results are complimentary to theirs in the rights structure
framework however, we also expand our scope to conditional implementation.
Our contribution also falls into the literature of implementation using effectivity
functions. Early but classic contributions in this area include Moulin and Peleg
(1982) and Greenberg (1990). In Peleg and Winter (2002), an effectivity function E
represents the constitution of the society. In this case, they study conditions for a
noncooperative game form to Nash implement a SCR, while the effectivity function
derived from the game form has to be compatible with E. More recently, Koray
and Yildiz (2018) introduced the notions of a rights structure and code of rights4,
3For more extensive reviews of implementation theory the reader can see Jackson (2001),
Palfrey (2002) or Maskin and Sjöström (2002). For a more recent overview, one can see Corchón
(2015).
4A code of rights is a rights structure, where the set of possible states coincides with set of
possible outcomes and the outcome function is the identity map.
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where implementation is achieved in a cooperative game-theoretic framework5.
They provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation with rights
structures on the full domain of preferences. Korpela et al. (2018) provide some
more results on implementation with codes of rights, by outlining the value of
utilizing coalitions in economic design.
Another related to our paper field is the modeling of rights in the social choice
literature. Since the impossibility result of Sen (1970), a substantial literature
has emerged that attempts to formulate the exercise of rights in a formal game-
theoretic framework, with the use of effectivity functions or noncooperative game
forms, such as Gibbard (1974), Gärdenfors (1981), Hammond (1996), Peleg (1997)
and Deb et al. (1997). In The more recent contribution of McQuillin and Sugden
(2011), they model rights with the use of games in transition function form, which
is much closer to the notion of a rights structure.
3.3 Environment
3.3.1 Primitives
The set of agents is N , with |N | ≥ 3, while the set of all possible coalitions of
agents is denoted byN = 2N and the set of all non-empty coalitions byN0. The set
of all possible outcomes is denoted by X1 ×X2, where X1 is the set of outcomes
in sector 1, while X2 is the set of outcomes in sector 2. For every agent i, we
define a complete reflexive and transitive binary relation on X1 ×X2, denoted by
Ri, which represents agent i’s preferences over X. As usual, by Pi we denote the
asymmetric part of Ri. Let the set of all possible preferences for i beRi. The set of
all possible preference profiles is denoted by R ≡ ×i∈NRi, with a typical element
R. By slightly abusing notation, we extend the relation R to coalitions, such that
for all K ∈ N0, (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) ∈ X1 × X2, we write (x1, x2)RK(y1, y2) if
and only if there exists i ∈ K such that (x1, x2)Ri(y1, y2). Now we define, for
any agent i ∈ N , outcome (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 and preference profile R ∈ R,
Li((x
1, x2), R) ≡ {(y1, y2) ∈ X1×X2|(x1, x2)Ri(y1, y2)} as agent i’s lower contour
set with respect to outcome (x1, x2) in preference profile R. Then, for any K ∈ N0,
(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 and R ∈ R, LK((x1, x2), R) ≡ ∪i∈KLi((x1, x2), R).
A social choice rule (SCR) is a correspondence φ : R ⇒ X1 ×X2, such that,
for any R ∈ R, ∅ 6= φ(R) ⊆ X1 ×X2. By φ(R) we denote the image of φ, that is
φ(R) ≡ {(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2|(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R), for some R ∈ R}.
5For some earlier similar results on implementation with cooperative game-theoretic devices
see Miyagawa (2002). An earlier notion of a rights structure is due to Sertel (2002).
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3.3.2 Constrained conditional rights structures
A rights structure for sector 2 is defined as Γ2 ≡ (S2, h2, γ2), and consists of a state
space S2, an outcome function h2 : S2 → X2, and an effectivity correspondence
γ2 : S2 × S2 ⇒ N . Let G2 be the set of all possible rights structures for sector 2.
Then, given Γ2 ∈ G2, a constrained (from Γ2) rights structure Γ1 ≡ (S1, h1, γ1) for
sector 1 consists of a state space S1, a constrained outcome function h1 : S1×S2 →
X1, and a constrained effectivity correspondence6 γ1(γ2) : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N . A
pair Γ1×Γ2 ≡ Γc is called a constrained conditional rights structure. A convenient
assumption that we make is that for any K ∈ N0 and (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2, we have
K ∈ γi(s1, s1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, s2), which allows us to define our equilibrium concept
more compactly. In essence, this assumption simply states that any coalition is
effective for no change or, equivalently, inaction is a possibility. For clarity, we
summarize in the following table:
Object Sector 2 Sector 1
State space S2 S1
Outcome function h2 : S2 → X2 h1 : S1 × S2 → X1
Effectivity correspondence γ2 : S2 × S2 ⇒ N γ1 : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N
Table 3.1: Constrained conditional rights structures
The intuition behind the notation is straightforward. While the given institu-
tion in sector 2 utilizes information only from the same sector, the institution in
sector 1 processes information from sector 2 as well. This information is expressed
in the conditionality of the outcome function and effectivity correspondence of
sector 1.
3.3.3 Conditional rights structures
We define a pair of conditional rights structures as Γ ≡ Γ1 × Γ2, where Γ1 =
(S1, h1, γ1) and Γ2 = (S2, h2, γ2). S1 and S2 are the state spaces, h1 : S1 ×
S2 → X1 and h2 : S2 × S1 → X2 are the conditional outcome functions, and
γ1 : S1 × S2 × S2 ⇒ N and γ2 : S2 × S2 × S1 ⇒ N are the conditional effectivity
correspondences for sectors 1 and 2 respectively. We make a similar assumption
about inaction being a possibility in this setting as well and we summarize in the
following table:
The interpretation here is that the social planner is forced to design an in-
stitution that is decisive for each sectoral outcome, in a decentralized manner.
6To ease notation, we will omit writing γ1 as function of γ2 for the rest of the paper.
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Object Sector 1 Sector 2
State space S1 S2
Outcome function h1 : S1 × S2 → X1 h2 : S2 × S1 → X2
Effectivity correspondence γ1 : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N γ2 : S2 × S2 × S1 ⇒ N
Table 3.2: Conditional rights structures
The incomplete communication that takes place between the two institutions is
expressed through conditionality. We proceed with our equilibrium notions.
3.3.4 Equilibrium notions
Our equilibrium notions are generalizations of the (weak) core equilibrium notion
for the two sector setting.
Definition 3.3.1. Given a pair of constrained conditional rights structures Γ1×Γ2,
a pair of states (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a γ-equilibrium in preference profile R ∈ R
if there is no (t1, t2) and K ∈ N0, with K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2) such that
(h1 × h2)(t1, t2)PK(h1 × h2)(s1, s2).
The equilibrium concept for conditional rights structures is very similar:
Definition 3.3.2. Given a pair of conditional rights structures, Γ1 × Γ2, a pair
of states (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a γ-equilibrium in preference profile R ∈ R if
there is no (t1, t2) and K ∈ N0, with K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2; t1) such that
(h1 × h2)(t1, t2)PK(h1 × h2)(s1, s2).
A comment with regards to our equilibrium concept. As the reader may no-
tice, we allow deviations by any coalition in one or both sectors “simultaneously”.
In fact, as it will become obvious later, it is this exact feature that makes our
environment interesting. Now let C(Γ1 × Γ2, R) = {(s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2|(s1, s2) is a
γ-equilibrium in profile R} be the set of γ equilibrium states in R.
3.3.5 Implementation concepts
The concept of implementation that we use is summarized in the following defini-
tion:
Definition 3.3.3. A pair of (constrained) conditional rights structures Γ1 × Γ2
γ-implements the SCR φ if, for all R ∈ R, we have that φ(R) = (h1×h2)◦C(Γ1×
Γ2, R).
A SCR φ is γ-implementable, or simply implementable, if it can be γ-implemented
by a (constrained) conditional rights structure Γ1× Γ2. In the case of constrained
conditional implementation of course, Γ2 is given.
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3.3.6 Examples
In this section we provide a few examples to compliment our formal definitions
and provide a more intuitive and graphic view of our model.
First, we show an example of a constrained conditional rights structure. Let
X1 = {x1, y1}, X2 = {x2, y2} and N = {1, 2}. Now consider Γ2 fixed as follows:
x2 y2
{2}
Figure 3.1: Example, fixed rights structure
In the above graph, rectangles represent the states, while arrows represent
effectivity. So, in this case, only agent 2 has the power to change x2 to y2 and this
is something that the planner has to take as given. Now consider the following
two possible preference profiles:
R R′
1 2 1 2
(y1, x2) (x1, x2) (x1, x2) (y1, y2)
(x1, x2) (x1, y2) (y1, x2) (x1, y2)
(x1, y2) (y1, x2) (y1, y2) (y1, x2)
(y1, y2) (y1, y2) (x1, y2) (x1, x2)
Table 3.3: Example of constrained rights structure, preferences
Suppose that the SCR φ is such that φ(R) = {(x1, y2), (y1, x2), (y1, y2)}, while
φ(R′) = {(x1, y2), (y1, y2)}. So the social planner, needs to devise a rights structure
Γ1 for sector 1, such that the constrained conditional rights structure Γ1 × Γ2
implements φ. Consider the constrained conditional rights structure below:
Γ1 Γ2
x1 y1
{1}
x2 y2
{2}
Figure 3.2: Constrained rights structures
That is, agent 1 has the right to change x1 to y1, regardless of the status quo
outcome in sector 2. Now notice the following: (y1, x2), (x1, y2) and (y1, y2) are all
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γ-equilibria in R. However, (x1, x2) is not, since agent 1 would like to move to y1,
as he prefers (y1, x2) to (x1, x2). Now let us consider profile R′. (y1, y2) is still a
γ-equilibrium in R′, but notice that (x1, y2) is not, since 1 would like to move from
x1 to y1 and get (y1, y2) which he prefers to (x1, y2). In such case, implementation
fails, since (x1, y2) ∈ φ(R′).
Now consider the following rights structure for sector 1 instead:
Γ1 Γ2
x1 y1
{1}, x2
x2 y2
{2}
Figure 3.3: Constrained rights structures
In this case, agent 1 has the right to change x1 to y1, only if the status quo7
in sector 2 is x2. The reader will notice in this case that (x1, y2) is a γ-equilibrium
in R′ as well and implementation is restored.
The previous example outlined the power of conditionality: In the first case,
the rights structure in sector 1 did not take into account any information about
sector 2. This information was expressed in the form of a conditional right. Agent
1’s right to move from x1 to y1 was conditional on the status quo in sector 2 being
x2.
To also illustrate the difficulties that arise with constrained conditional im-
plementation, consider the following example: As before, we have X1 = {x1, y1}
and X2 = {x2, y2} and a fixed rights structure for sector 2 as in Figure 3.1. Now
consider the following preference profile:
R
1 2
(x1, x2) (y1, y2)
(y1, x2) (y1, x2)
(y1, y2) (x1, y2)
(x1, y2) (x1, x2)
Table 3.4: Example of constrained rights structure, preferences
Suppose that the social planner desires to implement φ , were φ(R) = (y1, x2).
Notice that no matter how she designs Γ1, agent 2 can always change x2 to y2, as
7Notice that in the graph, below the arrow, x2 appears next to {1}. This means that agent
1 is entitled to change x1 to y1, only if x2 is status quo in sector 2.
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y2 is strictly better for him for any choice of outcome in sector 1. This makes the
SCR φ non-implementable, even with one preference profile. This example hints
towards our necessary conditions for constrained conditional implementation that
we explore in the next section.
Finally, to show how the planner can solve the above problem by redesigning
the rights structure in sector 2, we will show a conditional rights structure that
implements the above SCR with two preference profiles, as shown below:
R R′
1 2 1 2
(x1, x2) (y1, y2) (x1, x2) (y1, y2)
(y1, x2) (y1, x2) (y1, y2) (y1, x2)
(y1, y2) (x1, y2) (y1, x2) (x1, y2)
(x1, y2) (x1, x2) (x1, y2) (x1, x2)
Table 3.5: Example of conditional rights structure, preferences
Let φ(R) = (y1, x2) as before and φ(R′) = (y1, y2). Now consider the following
conditional rights structure:
Γ1 Γ2
x1 y1
{1}, y2
x2 y2
{2}, x1
{1}, y1
{1}, y1
Figure 3.4: Conditional rights structures
In R, (y1, x2) is the only γ-equilibrium: From (x1, x2) agent 2 can move to
(x1, y2), from (x1, y2) 1 moves to (y1, y2) and from (y1, y2) 1 can move to (y1, x2).
On the other hand, no one can block (y1, x2).
Similarly, in R′, the only equilibrium is (y1, y2). Notice that from (y1, x2) 1
moves to (y1, y2) which was not the case in R. Therefore, the above conditional
rights structures implement φ.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Constrained conditional implementation
Further definitions
Before we proceed to our results on constrained conditional implementation a
few further definitions are in order. Given a pair of constrained conditional rights
structures Γ1×Γ2, we define the range of Γ2 as h2(S2) ≡ {h2(s2) ∈ X2|s2 ∈ S2} and
the range of Γ1 as h1(S1, S2) ≡ {h1(s1, s2) ∈ X1|(s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2}. The range of
Γ1×Γ2 is (h1×h2)(S1, S2) ≡ {(h1(s1, s2), h2(s2)) ∈ X1×X2|(s1, s2) ∈ S1×S2}. For
any coalition K ∈ N \ {∅} and state s2 ∈ S2, let E(K, s2) ≡ {h2(t2) ∈ X2|t2 ∈ S2
and K ∈ γ2(s2, t2)} be the sector 2 outcomes that coalition K can induce from
state s2. Now, for any K ∈ N0 and (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 we define:
E(K, (s1, s2)) ≡ {(h1(t1, t2), h2(t2)) ∈ X1 ×X2|K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; t2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2)}.
That is, E(K, (s1, s2)) is the set of the attainable outcomes for coalition K from
the state pair (s1, s2). Notice that for any (x1, x2) ∈ E(K, (s1, s2)), x2 ∈ E(K, s2).
The previous definitions allow us to define γ-equilibrium more compactly: A pair
(s1, s2) is a γ-equilibrium in R ∈ R, if for any K ∈ N0, we have E(K, (s1, s2)) ⊆
LK((h
1 × h2)(s1, s2), R).
Finally, for any set T ⊆ X1 × X2, i ∈ {1, 2} and Zi ⊆ X i, let projZi{T} be
the projection of T onto Zi.
Necessary conditions
A helpful notion that will allow us to present our conditions more compactly is the
notion of the constrained lower contour set. Given Γ2, for any (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2,
K ∈ N \ {∅}, s2 ∈ S2 and R ∈ R, let the sector 2 constrained lower contour
set LK((x
1, x2), s2, R) ≡ {(y1, y2) ∈ X1 × E(K, s2)|(x1, x2)RK(y1, y2)} be the set
of outcomes that K can induce from state s2 that are weakly worse for K with
respect to (x1, x2) in profile R. In addition, for any Z1 × Z2 ⊆ X1 × X2, let
LK((x
1, x2), s̄2, R)|Z1×Z2 , be the restriction of LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R) to Z1×Z2. Now
we are ready to present our necessary conditions.
Definition 3.4.1. Let Γ2 be given. The SCR φ satisfies Condition E if there exists
a set Y 1 ⊆ X1, with projX1φ(R) ⊆ Y 1 and for all R ∈ R and (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R),
there exists s̄2((x1, x2), R) ≡ s̄2 ∈ S2 such that:
(i) h2(s̄2) = x2,
(ii) for all t2 ∈ S2 such that γ2(s̄2, t2) 6= ∅, we have that
h2(t2) ∈
⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2,t2) projX2{LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2)}, and
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(iii) for any R′ ∈ R, if for all K ∈ N0 we have LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2) ⊆
LK((x
1, x2), s̄2, R′), then it must be that (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′).
In our next proposition, we show that condition E is necessary for constrained
conditional implementation.
Proposition 6. If a SCR φ is constrained conditionally implementable in γ-
equilibrium, then it satisfies condition E .
Proof. Consider Γ2 as given. Suppose φ is constrained implementable by Γ1 and
let the true preference profile be R ∈ R with (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R). Define Y 1 ≡
projX1{(h1 × h2)(S1, S2)}. Obviously, from constrained implementability, it must
be that projX1φ(R) ⊆ Y 1 ⊆ X1.
We will first prove part (i). By implementability, there exists a pair of states
(s̄1, s̄2) ∈ S1×S2, such that (h1×h2)(s̄1, s̄2) = (x1, x2) and (s̄1, s̄2) ∈ C(Γ1×Γ2, R),
that is, for all K ∈ N0, E(K, (s̄1, s̄2)) ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R). Set s̄2 ≡ s̄2((x1, x2), R)
and notice that h2(s̄2) = x2. This completes the proof of part (i).
We will now prove part (ii). For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there
exists t2 ∈ S2, such that h2(t2) /∈
⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2,t2) projX2{LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2)}.
So, there exists K ∈ γ2(s̄2, t2), K 6= ∅, such that h2(t2) /∈ projX2{LK((x1, x2), s̄2,
R)|Y 1×h2(S2)}. This implies that, for any y1 ∈ Y 1, (y1, h2(t2)) /∈ LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R).
Now take any (t1, t2), such that K ∈ γ1(s̄1, t1; s̄2). It follows that K ∈ γ1(s̄1, t1; s̄2)
∩ γ2(s̄2, t2), while (h1(t1, t2), h2(t2)) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R). This however contradicts
that (x1, x2) ∈ (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R) and this completes the proof of (ii).
Moving to part (iii), consider a profile R′ ∈ R, such that for all K ∈ N0,
LK((x
1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2) ⊆ LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R′)Y 1×h2(S2) is true, yet, (x1, x2) /∈
φ(R′). Then, by constrained conditional implementability, it must be that (x1, x2) /∈
C(Γ1×Γ2, R′), so there must exist (t1, t2) ∈ S1×S2 and a coalition K ∈ N0, such
that K ∈ γ1(s̄1, t1; s̄2)∩γ2(s̄2, t2) and (h1×h2)(t1, t2) ≡ (z1, z2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R′).
By our assumption then we have (z1, z) /∈ LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2). Obviously,
(z1, z2) ∈ Y 1 × h2(S2), so it must be that (z1, z2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R). But then,
we have that K ∈ γ1(s̄1, t1; s̄2) ∩ γ2(s̄2, t2), while (z1, z2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R), which
clearly contradicts that (x1, x2) ∈ (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). This completes the
proof of (iii) and concludes the proof of Proposition 6.
Our condition contains three statements. Statement (i) is straightforward given
the definition of γ-implementability: it simply states that, for a constrained condi-
tionally implementable SCR φ, if (x1, x2) is φ-optimal for some R ∈ R, then there
must exist a “supporting” state s̄2 = s̄2((x1, x2), R) such that h2(s̄2) = x2. State-
ment (ii) can be considered as a “punishment” condition that our environment
must satisfy. We illustrate using the figure below:
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Γ1 Γ2
s1 s2 y2
{K,K ′}
Figure 3.5: Condition E , Rights structures
Consider the rights structures Γ1 and Γ2 as shown in Figure 1. Suppose that
(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R) for some R ∈ R, and s2 = s̄2((x1, x2), R), that is, h2(s2) =
x2. Now, if we hope to implement φ, it must be that deviations from s2 in
sector 2 are deterred when the preference profile is R. Indeed, suppose the
status-quo in sector 1 is s1. Notice that coalition K is effective for a change
from s2 to t2. For this change to not be profitable, it must be the case that
(h1(s1, t2), h2(t2)) ∈ LK((x1, x2), s2, R). Note though that this condition must also
hold for any coalition that is effective for a change from s2, so here it must be
that (h1(s1, t2), h2(t2)) ∈ ∩i∈{K,K′}Li((x1, x2), s2, R). This is the essence of our
condition E(ii).
How is our E(iii) condition different from the well-known Maskin-monotonicity
condition8? First we present Maskin-monotonicity formally in our environment
and then we use an example to illustrate.
Definition 3.4.2. A SCR φ satisfies Maskin-monotonicity (with respect to a set
Y ), if for any R,R′ ∈ R, (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R), the following implication holds:
[∀K ∈ N0, LK((x1, x2), R) ∩ Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R′)]⇒ (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′).
First, our condition only requires the nestedness of the lower contour sets with
respect to a subset of X1×X2. Secondly and most importantly, the lower contour
sets are restricted by the state in Γ2. To illustrate, consider the following setting.
Let X1 = {x1}, X2 = {x2, y2, z2}, X1 × X2 = {(x1, x2), (x1, y2), (x1, z2)}, R =
{R,R′} and the social choice rule φ defined as follows:
φ(R) = {(x1, x2), (x1, z2)}, φ(R′) = {(x1, z2)}.
In the table we depict the rankings of agents 1 and 2 in preference pro-
files R and R′ respectively and on the figure we have the rights structure Γ2.
The rectangles are the possible states, that is S2 = X2 and the arrows rep-
resent effectivity. For example, γ2(x2, z2) = {1}. Notice that when moving
8Maskin-monotonicity as stated in Maskin (1999) is somewhat simpler than this version which
is due to Korpela et al. (2018) who state it in terms of coalitions. Of course, if the nestedness
holds for any coalition, it holds for individuals as well.
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R1 R2 R
′
1 R
′
2
(x1, x2) (x1, z2) (x1, y2) (x1, z2)
(x1, y2) (x1, x2) (x1, x2) (x1, x2)
(x1, z2) (x1, y2) (x1, z2) (x1, y2)
Table 3.6: Condition E , Preferences
x2z2 y2
{2}{1}
Figure 3.6: Condition E , Γ2
from R to R′, (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R) falls in agent 1’s ranking as there is a preference
reversal with respect to (x1, y2), therefore the premise of Maskin-monotonicity
is not fulfilled and it holds vacuously. However, (x1, x2) is not an attainable
outcome for agent 1. Indeed, if we look at the constrained lower contour sets
we have that L1((x
1, x2), x2, R) ⊆ L2((x1, x2), x2, R′) and L2((x1, x2), x2, R) ⊆
L2((x
1, x2), x2, R′), but (x1, x2) /∈ φ(R′), hence E(iii) is violated and φ cannot be
constrained conditionally implemented. Our condition has a very similar flavour
to the one in Hayashi and Lombardi (2019), however it is tailored to our particular
environment of implementation with rights structures.
The following Lemma is easily obtained from Proposition 1 and will be partic-
ularly useful for the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 3. Let the SCR φ satisfy condition E . Then, for allR ∈ R, (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R)
and t2 ∈ S2,
⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2,t2) projX1{LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2)} 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose that the premises are true and φ satisfies Condition E . Now, con-
sider R ∈ R, (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R) and t2 ∈ S2 such that
⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2((x1,x2),R),t2) projX1{LK
((x1, x2), s̄2, R)|Y 1×h2(S2)} = ∅. This implies that there exists K ∈ γ2(s̄2, t2), such
that for all y1 ∈ Y 1, (y1, h2(t2)) /∈ LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R). However, this contradicts
E(ii).
We proceed with our second condition, which we also explain using an example.
Definition 3.4.3. Let Γ2 be given. A SCR φ satisfies constrained unanimity with
respect to Y 1 ⊆ X1 if we have projX1{φ(R)} ⊆ Y 1 and for all R ∈ R, x1 ∈ Y 1
and s2 ∈ S2, the following is true:
[∀K ∈ N0, Y 1 × E(K, s2) ⊆ LK((x1, h2(s2)), s2, R)]⇒ (x1, h2(s2)) ∈ φ(R).
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To illustrate, consider the following example:
N = {1, 2}, X1 = S1 = {x1}, X2 = S2 = {x2, y2, z2} and the preferences in
profile R and the rights structures Γ1 and Γ2 are as follows:
R1 R2
(x1, z2) (x1, z2)
(x1, x2) (x1, y2)
(x1, y2) (x1, x2)
Table 3.7: Constrained unanimity, Preferences
Γ1 Γ2
x1 x2 z2y2
{1} {2}
Figure 3.7: Constrained unanimity, Γ1 and Γ2
Notice that both agents prefer (x1, z2) to (x1, x2). However, by constrained
unanimity we must have (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R). This is because z2 is not attainable from
x2 by any coalition. Furthermore, since (x1, x2) is not top-ranked in the range
of the outcome functions, it would not have to be socially optimal if we applied
the standard unanimity concept as in Korpela et al. (2018). We now show that
constrained unanimity is a necessary condition for constrained implementation
with rights structures.
Proposition 7. Let Γ2 be given. If a SCR φ is constrained conditionally imple-
mentable, then it satisfies constrained unanimity.
Proof. Let Γ2 be given and suppose that φ is constrained conditionally imple-
mentable by Γ1. First, let Y 1 ≡ projX1{(h1×h2)(S1, S2)}. Now, consider x1 ∈ Y 1.
By the definition of Y 1, there exists (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2, such that h1(s1, s2) = x1.
Now suppose that for all K ∈ N0, we have Y 1×E(K, s2) ⊆ LK((x1, h2(s2)), s2, R),
yet, for the sake of contradiction, (x1, h2(s2)) /∈ φ(R). Then, by constrained con-
ditional implementability, there exists (t1, t2) ∈ S1×S2 with (t1, t2) 6= (s1, s2) and
K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2), such that (h1(t1, t2), h2(t2))PK(x1, h2(s2)). Notice
though that h1(t1, t2) ∈ Y 1 and h2(t2) ∈ E(K, s2). But, from out assumption, we
have that for all K ∈ N0, Y 1 × E(K, s2) ⊆ LK((x1, h2(s2)), s2, R), a contradic-
tion.
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Sufficient conditions
In the previous section, we proved that condition E , as well as constrained una-
nimity are necessary conditions for constrained conditional implementation with
rights structures. In this section we will show that they are also sufficient.
Theorem 4. If a SCR φ satisfies condition E and constrained unanimity, then it
is constrained-implementable in γ-equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the proof we use a canonical rights structure in the spirit of Koray and
Yildiz (2018) and Korpela et al. (2018). Our novelty lies on the fact that we
construct Γ1 conditionally on Γ2. Specifically, we design h1 such that it takes as
input not only the state in sector 1, but also the state in sector 2, that is h1 :
S1 × S2 → X1. This essentially captures the flow of information between sectors.
Furthermore, we design the effectivity correspondence γ1 : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N
so as to depend on three “issues”: (i) pairs of (s1, t1), (ii) the status quo state
in sector 2, s2, and (iii) γ2. What this construction essentially aims to capture
is that whether a coalition K is effective for a change from s1 to t1, depends on
what they are capable of obtaining from the status quo in sector 2, s2. Our full
characterization is a corollary of Proposition 6 and Theorem 4:
Corollary 3. Given a rights structure Γ2 for sector 2, a SCR φ is constrained
conditionally implementable if and only if it satisfies condition E and constrained
unanimity.
Proof. Implication of Proposition 6 and Theorem 4.
3.4.2 Conditional implementation
Further definitions
Similarly to the previous section on constrained conditional implementation, given
a pair of conditional rights structures Γ1 × Γ2, we define the attainable set as:
E(K, (s1, s2)) = {(h1(t1, t2), h2(t1, t2)) ∈ X1×X2|K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2)∩γ2(s2, t2; s1)}.
Necessary conditions
We first introduce our necessary conditions. Our first one is the well-known una-
nimity condition (as in Korpela et al. (2018)), which we show to be necessary in
our case.
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Definition 3.4.4. A SCR φ satisfies unanimity with respect to a set Y , if there
exists Y ⊇ φ(R), such that for any (x1, x2) ∈ Y and R ∈ R:
for all K ∈ N0, Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R)⇒ (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R).
Proposition 8. Let the SCR φ be conditionally implementable. Then it satisfies
unanimity.
Proof. Suppose that the premises hold. Let Y ≡ (h1 × h2)(S1, S2) ⊇ φ(R) and
suppose there exists (x1, x2) ∈ Y such that for all K ∈ N0, Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R),
for some R ∈ R. Now, since (x1, x2) ∈ Y , we have that (x1, x2) = (h1×h2)(s1, s2),
for some (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2. Suppose that (x1, x2) /∈ φ(R). Then, (s1, s2) /∈
C(Γ1 × Γ2, R), so there must exist (t1, t2) ∈ S1 × S2 and K ∈ N0, such that
(h1 × h2)(t1, t2)PK(x1, x2). But (h1 × h2)(t1, t2) ∈ Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R), by our
assumption, which is a contradiction.
The fact that unanimity is necessary for conditional implementation is not
surprising. In a setting where the social planner can design a “centralized” rights
structure Γ = (S, h, γ) and set X = X1 × X2 as the set of outcomes, Korpela
et al. (2018) have shown that unanimity is necessary for implementation. We now
introduce a variant of Maskin-monotonicity, which is also necessary in our case.
Definition 3.4.5. A SCR satisfies projection-monotonicity with respect to a set
Y , if there exists Y ⊆ X1 ×X2, such that for all R,R′ ∈ R and (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R):
for all K ∈ N0, [projX1{LK((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}] ∩ Y ⊆
LK((x
1, x2), R′)⇒ (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′).
Projection-monotonicity roughly says the following: Take (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R), for
some R ∈ R. Now consider a new profile R′ ∈ R where x /∈ φ(R′). Then, there
must exist an outcome (y1, y2) such that (x1, x2)RK(y
1, y2) and (y1, y2)P ′K(x
1, x2)
(preference reversal) for some K ∈ N , where (y1, y2) is a combination of sectoral
outcomes y1 and y2 that are in the respective projections of the lower contour
sets of K for (x1, x2) in R. Below we prove that it is necessary for conditional
implementation.
Proposition 9. If a SCR φ is conditionally implementable, then it must satisfy
projection-monotonicity.
Proof. Consider a conditionally implementable SCR φ by a conditional rights
structure Γ1 × Γ2. Set Y ≡ (h1 × h2)(S1, S2). Suppose that for all K ∈ N0,
projX1{LK((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)} ∩ Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R′). for
some R,R′ ∈ R, where (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R). Suppose that (x1, x2) /∈ φ(R′). Since
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(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R), there exists (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2, such that (s1, s2) ∈ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R),
where (h1 × h2)(s1, s2) = (x1, x2). Moreover, since (x1, x2) /∈ φ(R′), there exists
(t1, t2) ∈ S1 × S2 and K ∈ N0, with K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2; s1), such that
(h1 × h2)(t1, t2)P ′K(h1 × h2)(s1, s2) = (x1, x2). By our assumptions then, it must
be either that (h1 × h2)(t1, t2) /∈ Y , which is rejected by the very definition of
Y , or (h1 × h2)(t1, t2) /∈ projX1{LK((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}. This
implies that either (i) h1(t1, t2) /∈ projX1{LK((x1, x2), R)} or that (ii) h2(t1, t2) /∈
projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}. Suppose that (i) is true. Then, for all y2 ∈ X2, we
have that (h1(t1, t2), y2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R). Take y2 = h2(t1, t2). In such case
though, because K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2; s1), we have a contradiction that
(s1, s2) ∈ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). A similar argument applies for (ii). This completes the
proof.
An interesting lemma is the following:
Lemma 5. If a SCR φ satisfies Maskin-monotonicity with respect to a set Y , then
it also satisfies projection-monotonicity with respect to Y .
Proof. Suppose that a SCR φ satisfies Maskin-monotonicity with respect to Y
and consider R,R′ ∈ R and (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R), such that for all coalitions K ∈ N0,
[projX1{LK((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}] ∩ Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R′). Now
take (y1, y2) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R)∩Y . Clearly, we have that (y1, y2) ∈ [projX1{LK((x1,
x2), R)}×projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}]∩Y , so LK((x1, x2), R)∩Y ⊆ [projX1{LK((x1,
x2), R)}×projX2{LK((x1, x2), R)}]∩Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R′). By Maskin-monotonicity
we must have (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′) and we established that projection-monotonicity is
also true. This completes the proof.
In the previous lemma we showed that Maskin-monotonicity implies projection-
monotonicity. The converse of our lemma is not true, as shown in the following
example:
X1 = {x1, y1, z1}, X2 = {x2, y2, z2} and X = X1 ×X2.
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Ri R
′
i
(z1, z2) (y1, y2)
(y1, y2) (x1, x2)
(x1, x2) (z1, z2)
(z1, y2) (z1, y2)
(x1, y2) (x1, y2)
(y1, z2) (y1, z2)
(x1, z2) (x1, z2)
(y1, x2) (y1, x2)
Table 3.8: Projection-monotonicity, Preferences
Consider the above preference ranking for agent i and let φ(R) = {(x1, x2)},
while φ(R′) = {(y1, y2)}. Now notice that:
• Li((x1, x2), R) = {(x1, x2), (z1, y2), (x1, y2), (y1, z2), (x1, z2), (y1, x2)}
• Li((x1, x2), R′) = Li((x1, x2), R) ∪ {(z1, z2)}.
• projX1{Li((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{Li((x1, x2), R)} = X1 ×X2.
Therefore, we have Li((x
1, x2), R) ⊆ Li((x1, x2), R′) and Maskin-monotonicity
would dictate that (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′), but this is not the case. Hence φ is not
Maskin-monotonic. However, projX1{Li((x1, x2), R)} × projX2{Li((x1, x2), R)} *
Li((x
1, x2), R′), so the premise of projection-monotonicity is not satisfied and it
holds vacuously.
Sufficient conditions
In this section, we present our sufficiency theorem, which will conclude our study
of conditional implementation. Before introducing our conditions, we need a few
further definitions.
For any (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2, K ∈ N0 and R ∈ R, we define:
Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R) ≡ {(y1, y2) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R)|y2 = x2}
That is, Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R) is the outcomes that are in the lower contour set of
(x1, x2) for K in R, such that the outcome in sector 2 is x2. Similarly we can
define Lx
1
K ((x
1, x2), R). We are now ready to state our main sufficient condition
for conditional implementation:
Definition 3.4.6. A SCR φ satisfies P*-monotonicity with respect to a set Y ,
if there exists Y ⊆ X1 × X2 where φ(R) ⊆ Y such that for all R,R′ ∈ R and
(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R):
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for all K ∈ N0, [projX1{Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R)} × projX2{Lx
1
K ((x
1, x2), R)}] ∩ Y ⊆
LK((x
1, x2), R′)⇒ (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R′).
For our sufficiency theorem, we need one more condition. This is a domain
restriction, which is fairly easy to check in applications.
Definition 3.4.7. An environment satisfies domain restriction-I (DR-I) if for
any i ∈ N , R ∈ R, (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R) and (y1, y2) ∈ projX1{φ(R)} × projX2{φ(R)},
{(x1, y2), (y1, x2)} ⊆ Li((x1, x2), R)⇒ (y1, y2) ∈ Li((x1, x2), R)
Notice that DR-I is stated in terms of individual agents however, we can
actually work with a weaker version that includes coalitions. For the purpose
of this paper, we will keep with the agent-based restriction. DR-I restricts the
complementarity in preferences among sectors but it does not imply separability
of preferences9. This is shown by the following example:
Ri
(x1, x2)
(y1, x2)
(y1, y2)
(x1, y2)
Table 3.9: DR-I, Preferences
Let φ(R) = {(x1, x2)}. Notice that {(x1, y2), (y1, x2)} ⊆ Li((x1, x2), R) and
(y1, y2) ∈ Li((x1, x2), R). Separability of preferences though would require that
(x1, y2)Ri(y
1, y2), which is not the case.
P*-monotonicity and unanimity under DR-I become sufficient for conditional
implementation. The combination of P*-monotonicity and DR-I guarantees that
if there are no deviations in any one sector alone, then there will not be any
deviation in both sectors “simultaneously”, which is essentially the weak point of
conditional implementation. We proceed with our last theorem:
Theorem 6. Suppose that DR-I holds. If a SCR φ satisfies P*-monotonicity and
unanimity, then it is conditionally implementable.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
9Preferences are separable if (x1, x2)Ri(y
1, y2) implies that for all z2 ∈ X2, (x1, x2)Ri(y1, z2).
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3.5 Applications
3.5.1 Stable matching with partners and projects
Environment
As application of our Theorem 4, we consider a matching environment with part-
ners and projects as in Combe (2017), where matching occurs in triplets, from
three disjoint sets10. Our example of allocating GTAs and instructors to courses
falls into this setting. In most cases, this matching is decentralized in the sense
that the allocation of courses to instructors, is separated from the allocation of
courses to GTAs. Hence, it is natural to wonder whether we can achieve stabil-
ity in this case, when for example the rights structure for course allocation to
instructors is something fixed. Other possible interpretations of this environment
could include project-partner allocations in a firm, where for example a manager
has to be matched with a worker in order to undertake a particular project, or
assignment of male and female police officers to different patrolling duties11. What
makes our environment “pure”, is our assumption that no project can be left va-
cant or, equivalently, every agent prefers having a partner and/or a project to not
having any12.
The setting follows closely from Combe (2017) and is as follows: Let M,W,H
be three fixed and disjoint sets, such that |M | = |W | = |H| ≥ 2. We can interpret
M as the set of managers, W as the set of workers and H as the set of projects.
For any I ∈ {M,W}, an I-matching is a function µI : H → I ∪ {∅}, such that
h1 6= h2 =⇒ µI(h1) 6= µI(h2). Let the set of all M and W -matchings be MM
and MW , respectively.
Now, a matching is a function µ : H → [M ∪ {∅}] × [W ∪ {∅}], such that
for any h ∈ H, projM{µ(h)} ∈ MM and projW{µ(h)} ∈ MW . We will also use
the notion of the inverse image of µM and µW , that is, for any I ∈ {M,W} and
i ∈ I, we will write µ−1I (i) = h, if µI(h) = i and µ
−1
I (i) = ∅, if µI(h) = ∅. Let the
set of all matchings be M. For any I ∈ {M,W} and i ∈ I, Pi is a linear order
on (J∪{∅})×(H∪{∅}), where J ∈ {M,W}\I. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: For any I ∈ {M,W}, i ∈ I, J ∈ {M,W} \ I, j, k ∈ J and
h, h̄ ∈ H,
(j, h)Pi(∅, ∅), (j, h)Pi(k, ∅) and (j, h)Pi(∅, h̄).
10A similar environment can be found in Nicolo et al. (2019).
11This could be for example part of an affirmative action plan. In the UK there is significant
effort to have a balanced workforce with respect to gender.
12Implementability with noncooperative mechanisms in one-to-one matching environments is
studied in Tadenuma and Toda (1998), Korpela (2013) and Savva (2018).
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Our assumption dictates that any agent prefers to be assigned to a project
with a partner than not being assigned a project or a partner at all. For any
i ∈ {m,w}, we extend the relation Pi to the set of all matchings as follows: For
all I ∈ {M,W}, J ∈ {M,W} \ I, i ∈ I and µ, µ̄ ∈M:
µ i µ̄ ⇐⇒ (µJ(µ−1I (i)), µ
−1
I (i))Pi(µ̄J(µ̄
−1
I (i)), µ̄
−1
I (i)), and
µ ∼i µ̄ ⇐⇒ (µJ(µ−1I (i)), µ
−1
I (i)) = (µ̄J(µ̄
−1
I (i)), µ̄
−1
I (i))
The above expression simply states that the preferences over matchings are
extensions of the preferences over objects and partners, in the usual sense: an
agent prefers a matching over another if and only if she prefers her partner and
project under this matching to her partner and project in the other matching. As
usual, %i represents the reflexive part of i with the usual interpretation. The
set of all possible preferences over M for any i ∈ M ∪W is Ri and the set of all
possible preference profiles is R.
An ownership structure is a function θ : [M ∪{∅}]× [W ∪{∅}]×H →M ∪W ,
such that for any (m,w, h) ∈ [M ∪ {∅}] × [W ∪ {∅}] × H, θ(m,w, h) ∈ {m,w}.
Let the set of all ownership structures be Θ. Now, for any I ∈ {M,W}, θIS is a
strong I-ownership structure if for any h ∈ H, µI(h) ∈ I and for all h ∈ H and
µJ ∈MJ , θIS(µI(h), µJ(h), h) = µI(h). Essentially, a strong I-ownership structure
specifies that every project is assigned to an I member and the owner of any triplet
is an I member as well. Now we define a concept of stability given an ownership
structure.
Definition 3.5.1. µ ∈ M is individually rational in profile R ∈ R, if for any
I ∈ {M,W}, J ∈ {M,W} \ I and i ∈ I, we have (∅, µ−1I (i))Pi(µJ(µ
−1
I (i)), µ
−1
I (i)).
Definition 3.5.2. For any θ ∈ Θ, R ∈ R and µ ∈M, a blocking triplet (m,w, h) ∈
M ×W ×H with respect to θ in profile R, is such that (1) and either one of the
(2)-(4) is true:
(1) (w, h)Pm(µW (µ
−1
M (m)), µM(m)) and (m,h)Pw(µM(µ
−1
W (w)), µW (w)).
(2) µ−1M (m) = h and θ(m,µW (h), h) = m.
(3) µ−1W (w) = h and θ(µM(h), w, h) = w.
(4) µM(h) = µW (h) = ∅.
To give the intuition behind the last definition, a blocking triplet (m,w, h) is
such that either one of the following is true:
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• m is assigned to h and is the owner while both m and w prefer each other
with h than their current assignments.
• w is assigned to h and is the owner while both m and w prefer each other
with h than their current assignments.
• h is vacant while both m and w prefer each other with h than their current
assignments.
Definition 3.5.3. For any θ ∈ Θ and R ∈ R, a matching µ ∈M is strongly stable
with respect to θ, if it is individually rational and there exists no blocking triplet
(m,w, h) ∈M ×W ×H with respect to θ.
Notice that, because of Assumption 1, individual rationality is never binding
in our problem.
In this environment, a social choice rule is a correspondence ϕ : R ⇒ M,
such that for any %∈ R, ∅ 6= ϕ(%) ⊆ M. Given a strong I-ownership structure
θIS ∈ Θ, we define the stable rule given θIS as ϕSI : R⇒M such that for any %∈ R,
ϕSI (%) = {µ ∈ M|µ is strongly stable with respect to θIS in %}. While in general
strongly stable matchings may not exist in this triple matching environment, the
set of strongly stable matchings given a strong I-ownership structure is non-empty
as shown in Combe (2017). Essentially, by augmenting the triple matching envi-
ronment with an ownership structure, we restrict the possible blocking triplets by
only allowing owners to block their assigned project.
Rights structure of W sector
Let us assume that the rights structure in the sector that assigns projects to work-
ers is fixed, that is, it is not available for design. We will show that even when
this is the case, we can still γ-implement the stable rule with respect to θWS , by
showing that the environment ϕSW , Γ
W satisfies our conditions E and constrained
unanimity. In particular, we assume that ΓW is a code of rights, that is, a rights
structure where the state space consists only of outcomes, and the outcome func-
tion is simply the identity map. Essentially, it is a more natural specification of a
rights structure13. We formally define it below:
Let ΓW = (MW , γW ), where γW : MW × MW ⇒ 2W is such that for all
w,w′ ∈ W , µW , µ̄W ∈MW :
{w} ∈ γW (µW , µ̄W ) if and only if there exists h̄ ∈ H, such that µW (h̄) = ∅,
µ̄W (h̄) = w, for all h̃ ∈ H \ {h, h̄}, µ̄W (h̃) = µW (h̃), and [µ−1W (w) = h for some
h ∈ H]⇒ µ̄W (h) = ∅.
13For more results in implementation with codes of rights, see Koray and Yildiz (2018) and
Korpela et al. (2018).
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Therefore, the code of rights ΓW is such that it allows any worker to obtain a
vacant project. We consider this a very natural code of rights.
Constrained conditional-implementation
In the next proposition we show that we can implement the stable rule under
strong worker ownership, when the worker sector is fixed as above.
Proposition 10. Suppose that ΓW is fixed. Then ϕSW is constrained conditionally
implementable in γ-equilibrium.
Proof. We will show that ΓW and ϕSW satisfy condition E and constrained una-
nimity.
Take Y 1 ≡MM ⊇ projMM{ϕSW (R)}. Now, consider %∈ R and let (µM , µW ) ∈
ϕSW (%).
First, notice that (i) from condition E is trivially satisfied, as we can set
s̄2((µM , µW ),%) ≡ (µM , µW ).
Now we proceed to prove (ii). For the sake of contradiction, suppose there
exists µ̃W ∈ MW such that µ̃W /∈
⋂
K∈γW (µW ,µ̃W ) projMW {LK((µW , µM), µW ,%)}.
This implies that there exists K ∈ γW (µW , µ̃W ) such that for all µ̃M ∈ MM ,
(µ̃M , µ̃W ) /∈ LK((µW , µM), µW ,%). By the construction of ΓW , it must be that
K = {w}, µ̃−1W (w) = h and µ
−1
W (w) = ∅, for some h ∈ H. But, by Assumption 1
and since |W | = |H|, (µM , µW ) /∈ ϕSW , so we have a contradiction.
Now let us prove (iii). Take %′∈ R such that for all K ∈ N0, LK((µM , µW ), µW ,
%) ⊆ LK((µM , µW ), µW ,%′), but (µM , µW ) /∈ φSW (%′). Then, there must exist
(m,w, h) ∈M ×W ×H, such that
(w, h)P ′m(µW (µ
−1
M (m)), µM(m)), (m,h)P
′
w(µM(µ
−1
W (w)), µW (w)),
and either one of the following is true:
(1) µ−1M (m) = h and θ(m,µW (h), h) = m
(2) µ−1W (w) = h and θ(µM(h), w, h) = w.
(3) µM(h) = µW (h) = ∅.
(1) cannot be true due to strong W -ownership. (3) also cannot be the case as it
implies (µM , µW ) /∈ ϕSW (%) as well. Assume that (2) holds. Then, by our assump-
tion about the constrained lower contour sets, it must be that (w, h)Pm(µW (µ
−1
M (m)),
µM(m)) and (m,h)Pw(µM(µ
−1
W (w)), µW (w)), while µ
−1
W (w) = h and θ(µM(h), w, h)
= w, which contradicts that (µM(h), µW (h)) ∈ ϕSW (%). we conclude that our
environment satisfies E .
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Finally, we will prove that our environment satisfies constrained unanimity.
Suppose there exists Y 1 ⊆ MM such that projMM{ϕSW (R} ⊆ Y 1 and there exist
%∈ R and (µM , µW ) ∈ Y 1 ×MW such that for all K ∈ N0, Y 1 × E(K,µW ) ⊆
LK((µM , µW ), µW ,%), but (µM , µW ) /∈ ϕSW (%). Again, there must exist (m,w, h) ∈
M ×W ×H for which it holds that:
(w, h)Pm(µW (µ
−1
M (m)), µM(m)), (m,h)Pw(µM(µ
−1
W (w)), µW (w)),
and either one of the following is true:
(1) µ−1M (m) = h and θ(m,µW (h), h) = m
(2) µ−1W (w) = h and θ(µM(h), w, h) = w.
(3) µM(h) = µW (h) = ∅.
Again (1) is rejected by our assumption of strong W -ownership and (2) con-
tradicts Assumption 1. Suppose that (2) is true. Then we have a contradiction of
our assumption. Therefore, our environment satisfies constrained unanimity. By
Theorem 4, we conclude that ϕSW is constrained implementable and this completes
the proof.
The intuition of our positive result is derived from two features: First, the
choice of the “natural” rights structure for the fixed sector and second, from the
weak stability concept. Indeed, we conjecture that the implementation of φSW
would be a lot harder or even impossible with a different choice for a fixed rights
structure. This also relates to the question of how much freedom coalitions are
allowed to have during the matching process, but, most importantly, outlines the
importance of well behaved fixed institutions for constrained implementation. Ad-
ditionally, as shown by Combe (2017), if we strengthen the stability notion, the
set of stable matchings might be empty. Such difficulty would carry over to the
implementation problem as well.
Finally, a comment on this section vis-à-vis the contribution of Combe (2017),
who also presents an algorithm for the implementation of the stable rule under
one-sided ownership. It is straightforward to extend his algorithm in our setting.
Indeed, fix ΓW such that any worker can get a project if and only if it is vacant.
Now we define ΓM as follows: (i) Any manager is effective for acquiring a vacant
project and, (ii) any manager with the permission of a worker can acquire the
worker’s project. It is easy to see that these rights structures implement the stable
rule under strong manager ownership. However, we have shown a different result,
that is, given ΓW as above, we can implement the stable rule under strong worker
ownership.
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3.5.2 Multi-issue environment with lexicographic prefer-
ences
Setting
As application of our Theorem 6, we will prove the implementability of the weakly
Pareto optimal rule, by restricting our attention to an important subclass of pref-
erences, the lexicographic preferences14. We present the formal definition below:
Definition 3.5.4. Ri is a lexicographic preference if for all j ∈ {1, 2}, there
exists an order Rji on X
j and a linear order ≺i on {1, 2}, such that for any
(x1, x2), (y1, y2) ∈ X1 ×X2:
(x1, x2)Ri(y
1, y2) ⇐⇒ xjRjiyj for some j ∈ {1, 2} and for all k ∈ {1, 2} such that
ykRki x
k, there exists j ≺i k with xjRjiyj.
Let the set of all lexicographic preferences for agent i be Rlexi ⊆ Ri and let
Rlex ⊆ R be the set of all possible lexicographic preference profiles. Now, the
planner knows that the true profile R is an element of Rlex, but she does not
know which one. An interpretation is that the planner knows that agents have
lexicographic preferences with respect to the issues, but she does not know the
priority ordering ≺i of each agent. Next we define the Weak Pareto optimal set.
Definition 3.5.5. For each R ∈ Rlex and Z ⊆ X1 × X2, let WPO(R) =
{(x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2| there is no (y1, y2) ∈ Z such that for all i ∈ N , (y1, y2)Pi(x1, x2)}.
Now, we define the Weak Pareto optimal rule as a correspondence φWPO :
Rlex ⇒ X1×X2, such that for all R ∈ Rlex, φWPO(R) = WPO(R). We will show
that φWPO is conditionally implementable. First, we establish that our environ-
ment satisfies DR-I.
Lemma 7. Rlex satisfies DR-I.
Proof. Suppose that (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2 and that {(x1, y2), (y1, x2)} ⊆ Li((x1, x2), R),
for some R ∈ Rlex and (y1, y2) ∈ X1×X2. Suppose that (y1, y2) /∈ Li((x1, x2), R).
Now, {(x1, y2), (y1, x2)} ⊆ Li((x1, x2), R) implies x1R1i y1 and x2R2i y2, which in
turn, these two statements imply (x1, x2)Ri(y
1, y2). This however contradicts that
(y1, y2)Pi(x
1, x2). Since the previous argument holds for any (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2,
it should also be true for any (x1, x2) ∈ φWPO(R). This concludes the proof.
We have guaranteed that our environment satisfies DR-I. Now we show that
φWPO satisfies P*-monotonicity and unanimity.
14For an early axiomatization of lexicographic preferences, see Fishburn (1975).
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Proposition 11. φWPO satisfies P*-monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. First we show that φWPO satisfies P*-monotonicity with respect to a set Y .
Suppose that for all K ∈ N0, [projX1{Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R)} ×projX2{Lx
1
K ((x
1, x2), R)}]
∩ Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R′), for some R,R′ ∈ Rlex and (x1, x2) ∈ φWPO(R). Suppose
that (x1, x2) /∈ φWPO(R′). We claim that there must exist (y1, y2) ∈ φWPO(R′),
such that for all j ∈ N , (y1, y2)P ′j(x1, x2). First, notice that since (x1, x2) /∈
φWPO(R′), there exists (z1, z2) ∈ X1×X2, such that for all j ∈ N , (z1, z2)P ′j(x1, x2).
If it is the case that (z1, z2) ∈ φWPO(R′), then we are done. Suppose not. Then,
there exists (w1, w2) ∈ X1×X2, such that for all j ∈ N , (w1, w2)P ′j(z1, z2)P ′j(x1, x2).
If (w1, w2) ∈ φWPO(R′), then we are done. If not, then we can continue this rea-
soning and the existence of such (y1, y2) is guaranteed by the finiteness of the sets
X1 and X2. Now, by our assumption, we have either (y1, y2) /∈ Y which is rejected
since Y ⊆ φ(R), or (y1, y2) /∈ projX1{Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R)}× projX2{Lx
1
K ((x
1, x2), R)}.
This implies either (i) (y1, x2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R) or (ii) (x1, y2) /∈ LK((x1, x2), R).
Suppose that (i) is true. Then, we have that for all i ∈ N , (y1, x2)Pi(x1, x2), which
contradicts that (x1, x2) ∈ φWPO(R). A similar argument holds for (ii) and this
concludes the proof.
Finally, we show that φWPO satisfies unanimity with respect to some set Y
such that φWPO(R) ⊆ Y . Let Y ≡ φWPO(R) and suppose that for all K ∈ N0,
Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R), for some R ∈ Rlex and (x1, x2) ∈ Y . Now assume to the
contrary that (x1, x2) /∈ φWPO(R). Then, there exists (y1, y2) ∈ Y , such that for all
i ∈ N , (y1, y2)Pi(x1, x2). This however contradicts our premise and this concludes
the proof.
We conjecture that our previous result would also hold in a multi-issue bar-
gaining environment with lexicographic preferences, given that we assume strict
monotonicity on the preferences and that X1 ⊆ R and X2 ⊆ R are closed.
3.6 Discussion of results and conclusion
3.6.1 Discussion
First, a comment with regards to the canonical rights structures that we use in
the proofs of Theorems 4 and 6. It is well-known in implementation theory, that
the proofs of the sufficiency theorems rely on complicated constructions, with
unnatural characteristics, such as integer games or unbounded message spaces.
Also, these constructions can be criticized for being too abstract.
Indeed the interpretation of the state space in a canonical rights structure is
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not very clear15. However, the aim of these constructions is not to describe a
realistic mechanism design application, rather than characterize what is possible.
With respect to the first critique though, we claim that rights structures, by
demanding implementation in a cooperative concept, abstract from the possibly
problematic features of noncooperative interaction, especially when the social plan-
ner is interested in preventing coalitional deviations. This is particularly evident
on the neat characterization theorems that one obtains when considering imple-
mentation via rights structures. Indeed, as Aumann (1987) observes:
(...) when one does build negotiation and enforcement procedures ex-
plicitly into the model, then the results of a non-cooperative analysis
depend very strongly on the precise form of the procedures, on the
order of making offers and counteroffers, and so on. This may be ap-
propriate in voting situations in which precise rules of parliamentary
order prevail, where a good strategist can indeed carry the day. But
problems of negotiation are usually more amorphous; it is difficult to
pin down just what the procedures are. More fundamentally, there is
a feeling that procedures are not really all that relevant; that it is the
possibilities for coalition forming, promising and threatening that are
decisive, rather than whose turn it is to speak. Aumann (1987)
3.6.2 Conclusion
We used implementation theory as a tool to study decentralization and tackled
two issues in the general framework of rights structures: First, we characterized
the set of implementable social choice rules when one sector is fixed and second, we
provided some necessary and some sufficient conditions for implementation when
both sectors are objects of design. The value of our theorems is also outlined with
applications.
Our results show the limitations that decentralization poses when the social
goal, as well as agent’s preferences, are non-separable across several issues. More
importantly, our findings outline that these limitations are robust to some (in-
complete) intersectoral communication. This is evident when we compare our
conditions with Korpela et al. (2018) for example, where implementation in a cen-
tralized environment is considered. This is because of a very fundamental reason:
the absence of central authority, capable of monitoring “simultaneous” deviations.
On the other hand though, when we compare our results with Hayashi and
Lombardi (2017), our results seem positive. This is because, by allowing for in-
tersectoral communication, we do not demand any sort of decomposability on
15Koray and Yildiz (2018) provide a nice interpretation as an analogue of deviation-constrained
mechanisms. For a further discussion, see Yildiz (2019).
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the social choice rule. In this way, we feel that our results outline the value of
conditionality in constitution design and provide a more realistic description of
decentralized implementation.
Even though we tried to explore many directions in this paper, there are still
various topics that are left for future research. For example, we have only studied
implementation with rights structures, while it would be interesting to explore
(constrained) conditional implementation with codes of rights. Another fruitful
avenue for further research is to identify particular rights structures or mechanisms
in decentralized environments that implement desirable rules.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Of course, we consider Γ2 as given. First, suppose that a SCR φ satisfies
Condition E and constrained unanimity with respect to a set Y 1 ⊇ projX1{φ(R)}.
Now we define the constrained conditional rights structure Γ1 = (S1, h1, γ1) as
follows:
State space
Let T 1 ≡ {((x1, x2), R) ∈ X1 × X2 × R|(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R)}. Then we define S1 ≡
T 1 ∪ Y 1.
Outcome function
Let h1 : S1 × S2 → X1 be such that for all (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2,
• If s1 = ((x1, x2), R) and s2 6= s̄2((x1, x2), R) ≡ s̄2, then h1(s1, s2) = y1 ∈⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2,s2) projX1{LK((x1, x2), s̄2, R)}, where y1 is such that (y1, h2(s2)) ∈⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2,s2) LK((x
1, x2), s̄2, R).
• Otherwise, h1(((x1, x2), R), s2) = h1(x1, s2) = x1.
Effectivity correspondence
Let γ1 : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N be such that for all (s1, t1; s2) ∈ S1 × S1 × S2:
1. If s1 = ((x1, x2), R) and s2 = s̄2((x1, x2), R), then for all K ∈ N0:
K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ⇐⇒ for all t2 ∈ S2 such that K ∈ γ2(s2, t2), we have
(h1 × h2)(s1, s2)RK(h1 × h2)(t1, t2).
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2. Otherwise, for all K ∈ N0, K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2).
In order to show that for any R ∈ R, φ(R) = (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R), we
break the proof in two parts:
Part 1: For all R ∈ R, φ(R) ⊆ (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R).
Let (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R) for some R ∈ R and consider s1 = ((x1, x2), R), s2 =
s̄2((x1, x2), R), the existence of the latter guaranteed by Condition E(i). Then,
from the outcome function, we have (h1(s1, s2), h2(s2)) = (x1, x2). Now, for the
sake of contradiction, consider K ∈ N0 and suppose there exists (t1, t2) ∈ S1 ×
S2, with (t1, t2) 6= (s1, s2), such that K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2) and (h1 ×
h2)(t1, t2)PK(x
1, x2). We distinguish the following cases:
1. t1 = s1, t2 6= s2 (K “moves” only in sector 2): Then, by the outcome func-
tion we have (h1 × h2)(t1, t2) = (y1, h2(s2))RK(x1, x2) for all K ∈ γ2(s2, t2),
where the existence of y1 is guaranteed by Lemma 3. This contradicts our
assumption that (h1 × h2)(t1, t2)PK(x1, x2).
2. t1 6= s1, t2 = s2 (K “moves” only in sector 1): Then, by the effectivity
correspondence we have that (x1, x2)RK(h
1 × h2)(t1, s2), a contradiction.
3. t1 6= s1, t2 6= s2 (K “moves” in both sectors): Again, by the effectivity
correspondence it must be that (x1, x2)RK(h
1 × h2)(t1, t2), a contradiction.
Thus, in all cases, E(K, (s1, s2)) ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R) and it holds that (s1, s2) ∈
C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). We now proceed to the second part of the proof.
Part 2: For all R ∈ R, (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R) ⊆ φ(R):
Consider (s1, s2) ∈ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). We will show that (y1, y2) ∈ φ(R). First of
all, if s1 = ((y1, y2), R) and s2 = s̄2((y1, y2), R) there is nothing to prove. We then
distinguish the following cases:
1. s1 = y1: Let (h1×h2)(s1, s2) = (y1, y2). By the design of γ1, we have that for
all K ∈ N0 and t1 ∈ S1, K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2). Therefore, for (s1, s2) to be a γ-
equilibrium in R it must be that for all K ∈ N0, projX1{φ(R)}×E(K, s2) ⊆
Y 1 × E(K, s2) ⊆ L((y1, y2), s2, R) and by constrained unanimity we have
(y1, y2) ∈ φ(R).
2. s1 = ((y1, y2), R′). Then we can have two possible subcases:
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(a) s2 6= s̄2((y1, y2), R′): Then, we have h1(s1, s2) = z1, such that z1 ∈⋂
K∈γ2(s̄2((y1,y2),R),s2) projX1{LK((y1, y2), R)}. Let h2(s2) = z2. Now, by
γ1, for all K ∈ N0 and t1 ∈ S1, K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2). Thus, as before,
it must be that for any K ∈ N0, projX1{φ(R)} × E(K, s2) ⊆ Y 1 ×
E(K, s2) ⊆ L((y1, y2), s2, R). Again constrained unanimity dictates that
(z1, z2) ∈ φ(R).
(b) s2 = s̄2((y1, y2), R′): Then, (h1(s1, s2), h2(s2)) = (y1, y2). By the de-
sign of γ1, we have that K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩ γ2(s2, t2) if and only if
(h1 × h2)(t1, t2) ∈ LK((y1, y2), s̄2, R′)|Y 1×h2(S2). For (s1, s2) to be a γ-
equilibrium, we must have LK((y
1, y2), s̄2, R′)|Y 1×h2(S2) ⊆ LK((y1, y2), s̄2, R).
By condition E(iii) then, we have that (y1, y2) ∈ φ(R) as well. This con-
cludes the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Consider the following rights structure. We will show that it implements
any SCR φ that satisfies P-monotonicity and unanimity with respect to a set
Y ⊆ X1 ×X2 under the DR-I assumption.
State space
We define T 1 = {((x1, x2), R) ∈ Y × R|(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R)}. Now let S1 ≡ T 1 ∪
projX1{Y }. Similarly, T 2 = {((x1, x2), R) ∈ Y × R|(x1, x2) ∈ φ(R)} and S2 ≡
T 2 ∪ projX2{Y }.
Outcome functions
The outcome functions are as follows:
• h1 : S1 × S2 → X1 such that, for any s1 ∈ {((x1, x2), R), x1} ⊆ S1 and
s2 ∈ S2, h1(s1, s2) = h1(s1) = x1.
• h2 : S2 × S1 → X2 such that, for any s2 ∈ {((x1, x2), R), x2} ⊆ S2 and
s1 ∈ S1, h2(s1, s2) = h2(s2) = x2.
Effectivity correspondences
We define the effectivity correspondences accordingly:
γ1 : S1 × S1 × S2 ⇒ N , such that for all (s1, t1; s2) ∈ S1 × S1 × S2:
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1. If s1 = s2 = ((x1, x2), R), then for all K ∈ N0, K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ⇐⇒
(h1(t1), x2) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R).
2. In all other cases, for all K ∈ N0, K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2).
γ2 : S2 × S2 × S1 ⇒ N , such that for all (s2, t2; s1) ∈ S2 × S2 × S1:
1. If s1 = s2 = ((x1, x2), R), then for all K ∈ N0, K ∈ γ2(s2, t2; s1) ⇐⇒
(x1, h2(t2)) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R).
2. In all other cases, for all K ∈ N0, K ∈ γ2(s2, t2; s1).
We proceed to show that for all R ∈ R, φ(R) = (h1 × h2) ◦C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). We
break the proof into two parts:
Part 1: For all R ∈ R, φ(R) ⊆ (h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R).
Let the true state be R ∈ R and s1 = ((x1, x2), R) = s2. Then, (h1 ×
h2)(s1, s2) = (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R). Consider (t1, t2) 6= (s1, s2) and K ∈ γ1(s1, t1; s2) ∩
γ2(s2, t2; s1). Then, if s1 6= t1 and s2 = t2, we have (h1(t1), x2) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R).
If s1 = t1 and s2 6= t2 we have (x1, h2(t2)) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R). Finally, if s1 6=
t1 and s2 6= t2 we have that (h1(t1), x2) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R) and (x1, h2(t2)) ∈
LK((x
1, x2), R). By DR-I we have that (h1(t1), h2(t2)) ∈ LK((x1, x2), R), and
we have no possible profitable move by an arbitrary coalition K. Then (x1, x2) ∈
(h1 × h2) ◦ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R).
Part 2: For all R ∈ R, (h1 × h2) ◦ (Γ1 × Γ2, R) ⊆ φ(R).
Now, let the true state be R ∈ R and consider (s1, s2) ∈ C(Γ1 × Γ2, R). We
have the following cases:
1. s1 = s2 = ((x1, x2), R′): Then, for (s1, s2) to be a γ-equilibrium, it must be
that for all K ∈ N0, E(K, (s1, s2)) ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R). Now, for all K ∈ N0,
[projX1{Lx
2
K ((x
1, x2), R′)}×projX2{Lx
1
K ((x
1, x2), R′)}]∩Y ⊆ E(K, (s1, s2)) ⊆
LK((x
1, x2), R). Then, by P-monotonicity we have that (x1, x2) ∈ φ(R).
2. All other cases: Let (h1×h2)(s1, s2) = (x1, x2). By the effectivity correspon-
dence, for all K ∈ N0, E(K, (s1, s2)) = Y and since (s1, s2) ∈ C(Γ1×Γ2, R),
we have Y ⊆ LK((x1, x2), R). By unanimity, we must have that (x1, x2) ∈
φ(R). This completes the proof.
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Chapter 4
A note on partially honest
implementation with rights
structures
4.1 Introduction
Motives and behavioural traits have become increasingly prevalent in economic
theory and it is not without a good reason. Indeed, they have shown to provide
a richer analytical framework and explain a larger set of economic and social
phenomena, that classical theory failed to tackle.
There is a substantial literature that explores the effect of behavioural biases or
motives in implementation theory1. After the seminal contributions of Matsushima
(2008) and Dutta and Sen (2012) who introduced a minimal honesty motive to the
implementation problem, the theory has explored various equilibrium notions and
specifications2. However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has focused
only on noncooperative implementation notions, that is, implementation by game
forms, or simply mechanisms. This implies that the results rely heavily on the
specific equilibrium concept.
Instead, in this note we follow the contribution of Koray and Yildiz (2018)
who introduce the notion of a rights structure. In this setting, the social planner
designs a state space, an outcome function that maps states to social outcomes,
and an effectivity correspondence, by which she endows agents or coalitions with
1For a survey on the frontier of behavioural implementation and some relevant open questions,
see Dutta (2019), as well as other contributions in the same volume.
2Just to name a few, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2019) for a full characterization for partially
honest Nash implementation, Savva (2018) for strong Nash implementation, Korpela (2014) for
Bayesian implementation, Saporiti (2014) for secure implementation, Hagiwara (2019) for double
implementation, and Mukherjee et al. (2017) for elimination of undominated strategies.
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rights to change the status quo state. In equilibrium, no coalition who has the
power to change the state has any incentive to do so. Implementation of a social
choice rule is achieved when the set of equilibrium outcomes coincide with the set
of socially optimal outcomes that the rule specifies, for any possible preference
profile.
The above implementation concept, by being cooperative in nature, admits
characterizations that are not very specific to the equilibrium notion and how
the game will actually be played. Moreover, the sufficiency theorems do not rely
on complicated and unnatural constructions, such as integer and modulo games.
Along this new line of research we mention also the contribution of Korpela et al.
(2018) who provide a complete characterization of implementation with codes of
rights3.
In our study, we provide a sufficient condition for implementation with rights
structures, when there exists at least one partially honest agent in the society,
i.e. an agent who prefers to tell the truth, when the welfare she derives from the
outcome is not at stake. Our condition is the well-known unanimity condition. In
this way, we provide an analogue of the contribution of Dutta and Sen (2012) in the
rights structure framework. In the next section we present our formal environment,
while section 4.3 contains our results. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Model
The society consists of a set of agents N = {1, ..., n}, where n ≥ 2 and a (finite)
set of social outcomes X. Each agent i is endowed with a weak preference relation
Ri on X, where Pi and Ii is its strict and symmetric part respectively. The set of
all possible preferences for each i is denoted Ri. An n-tuple R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈
R1 × ...×Rn ≡ R, is called a preference profile.
A social choice rule φ is a correspondence φ : R ⇒ X, such that for any R,
φ(R) ⊆ X is nonempty. The image of φ is denoted by φ(R).
A rights structure is a triplet Γ = (S, h, γ) is such that S is a state space,
h : S → X is an outcome function that maps states to outcomes, and γ : S×S ⇒ N
is an effectivity correspondence such that, for any (s, t) ∈ S×S, γ(s, t) is the set of
agents who individually4 are effective to change the state from s to t. Finally, let
h(S) ≡ {x ∈ X| there exists s ∈ S, h(s) = x} be the range of the rights structure.
In our setting, states contain more information than merely an outcome. It is
3A codes of rights is a rights structure where the state space is the set of outcomes and the
outcome function is the identity map.
4Indeed, an effectivity correspondence can be defined more generally for coalitions. In our
setting we consider individual-based rights structures. This is done without loss of generality for
our weak-core solution concept as shown by Korpela et al. (2018).
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this exact feature of the rights structure which the social planner can use as leverage
to exploit the partial honesty motive. For this purpose, we restrict attention to
rights structures Γ = (S, h, γ), such that S ⊆ X × R. A few further definitions
are in order:
Given a rights structure Γ, we define the truth correspondence T Γ : R ⇒ S,
such that, for any profile R ∈ R, T Γ(R) = X×{R}. Now, given a rights structure
Γ and a preference profile R, for any agent i we define %Ri as a binary, reflexive
and transitive relation on S × S, as follows:
Definition 4.2.1. An agent i ∈ N is partially honest if for all s, t ∈ S and R ∈ R,
the following are true:
(i) If h(s)Iih(t), s ∈ T Γ(R) and t /∈ T Γ(R), then s Ri t
(ii) Otherwise, h(s)Rih(t) ⇐⇒ s %Ri t.
An agent i ∈ N is not partially honest if for all s, t ∈ S and R ∈ R,
h(s)Rih(t) ⇐⇒ s %Ri t.
From now on, we make the following assumption:
Assumption: There exists at least one partially honest in agent in N .
Even though in this setting the social planner knows about the existence of a
partially honest agent, she does not know who he is. Now, as before, we write
%R= (%R1 , ...,%
R
n ), for a profile of the agents’ preferences on states, induced by R.
Definition 4.2.2. Given a rights structure Γ = (S, h, γ) and a preference profile
R ∈ R, a state s ∈ S is a γ-equilibrium in R, if for all t ∈ S and i ∈ N such that
{i} ∈ γ(s, t), we have s %Ri t.
Let C(Γ,%R) be the set of γ-equilibrium states in R and h ◦ C(Γ,%R) the set
of outcomes that correspond to the γ-equilibrium states. Then, a rights structure
Γ = (S, h, g) implements the social choice rule φ in γ-equilibrium, if for all R ∈ R,
φ(R) = h ◦ C(Γ,%R).
The interpretation of our setting is as follows: The ethical concerns of the so-
ciety are represented by a (fixed) social choice rule, which prescribes the outcomes
that are considered acceptable for each possible preference profile of the agents.
The social planner desires the realization of socially optimal outcomes, but the
problem is that she does not know the actual preference profile of the agents.
Therefore she designs a rights structure Γ such that, in the γ-equilibrium, socially
optimal outcomes, and only those, are realized, for any possible preference profile.
In this case we have an implementation of the social choice rule.
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Additionally, in our setting, the rights structure is constructed such that each
state consists of two parts: (i) an outcome and (ii) a preference profile (which
of course has no direct relationship with the true preference profile). A broader
interpretation due to Koray and Yildiz (2018) is that the preference profile part in
the state represents the context or frame, with which each outcome is supported
by.
To give an example of that, consider a bargaining situation, where for exam-
ple outcome x is under consideration. Then, the social planner can design the
bargaining protocol such that an agent might be entitled to propose outcome y
from x, only if a certain context applies. For instance, an agent may be entitled
to propose an outcome y when x is under consideration, only if they “claim” they
prefer x to y. The claim is the context in our setting. This particular scheme
resembles Maskin’s canonical mechanism and we will utilize it in the proof of our
theorem.
A partially honest agent then is one that prefers “truly” supporting contexts.
Driven by a sense of honesty or consistency, a partially honest agent has preferences
over the states and specifically on the part that corresponds to the preference
profile. So, when a partially honest agent contemplates whether to deviate from
a status quo to a new state, first she assesses whether the move is profitable with
respect to the outcomes and, if and only if she indifferent between the outcomes,
she strongly prefers to move to the new state when its preference profile part
corresponds to the true preference profile, while this is not true for the status quo.
To explain the permissiveness of partial honesty in the implementation problem
more intuitively, suppose first that there are no partially honest agents. Then,
suppose that state (x,R′) is an equilibrium in preference profile R. Now, if the
rights structure implements the SCR φ, we must have that x ∈ φ(R′). Consider
now the existence of a partially honest agent. Then, given that the preference
profile part of the state (x,R′) is different than the true one, a partially honest
agent may wish to deviate to another state. We are therefore not required to have
x ∈ φ(R) in this case.
To clarify the above discussion, consider the following example. We have two
possible outcomes X = {x, y}, two agents N = {1, 2} and two possible preference
profiles R = {R,R′} as follows:
R R′
1 2 1 2
x y x xy
y x y
Table 4.1: Example, Preferences
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Suppose that the SCR φ is such that φ(R) = {x, y}, while φ(R′) = {x} and
consider the following rights structure:
(x,R′) (y,R)
{1}
{2}
Figure 4.1: Example, rights structure
The state space is S = {(x,R′), (y,R)}. Let h((x,R′)) = x and h((y,R)) = y.
Now notice that both (x,R′) and (y,R) are γ-equilibria in preference profile R,
as neither agent 1 wants to move to (y,R), nor 2 would like to move to (x,R′).
Let us now focus on profile R′. Suppose that no agent is partially honest. First,
see that (x,R′) is a γ-equilibrium. However, (y,R) is also a γ-equilibrium in R′
and implementation fails, as y /∈ φ(R′). Now suppose that 2 is partially honest.
Then, since in R′ he is indifferent between x and y, he would like to reveal the
true state and move to (x,R′), thus eliminating (y,R) from the equilibria. Thus,
implementation is restored.
4.3 Results
Before we proceed with our main result, we present the result of Korpela et al.
(2018), who provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice
rules without any behavioural assumptions. The two relevant conditions are
Maskin-monotonicity and unanimity and we state them below:
Definition 4.3.1. A SCR φ satisfies Maskin-monotonicity with respect to Y , if
there exists a set Y ⊆ X with Y ⊇ φ(R) such that, for all R,R′ ∈ R and x ∈ φ(R),
[ for all i ∈ N , Li(x,R) ∩ Y ⊆ Li(x,R′)]⇒ x ∈ φ(R′).
Definition 4.3.2. A SCR φ satisfies unanimity with respect to Y , if there exists
a set Y ⊆ X with Y ⊇ φ(R) such that, for all R ∈ R and x ∈ Y , if for all i ∈ N
we have Y ⊆ Li(x,R), then x ∈ φ(R).
Theorem 8 (Korpela et al. (2018)). A SCR φ is implementable if and only if it
satisfies Maskin-monotonicity and unanimity.
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In our result, we are able to dispose of Maskin-monotonicity as a sufficient
condition. Instead we show that unanimity alone is sufficient:
Theorem 9. A SCR φ is implementable with partially honest agents if it satisfies
unanimity.
Proof. Suppose that φ satisfies unanimity with respect to Y and consider the
following rights structure:
• S = {(x,R) ∈ Y ×R}.
• h : S → X, such that for all s = (x,R) ∈ S, h(s) = x.
• γ : S × S ⇒ N , such that, for all (s, t) ∈ S × S, where s = (x,R):
(i) If x ∈ φ(R), then for all i ∈ N and t ∈ S, {i} ∈ γ(s, t) ⇐⇒ xRih(t).
(ii) Otherwise, for all i ∈ N and t ∈ S, {i} ∈ γ(s, t).
We will show that Γ implements φ. We break the proof into two parts:
Part 1: For all R ∈ R, φ(R) ⊆ h ◦ C(Γ,R):
Let x ∈ φ(R), for some R ∈ R. Consider s = (x,R). Then for all t ∈ S with
h(t) 6= x and i ∈ N , {i} ∈ γ(s, t) if and only if xRih(t), thus s ∈ C(Γ,R) and
clearly, x ∈ h ◦ C(Γ,R).
Part 2: For all R ∈ R, h ◦ C(Γ, R) ⊆ φ(R):
We will prove this part in two steps. First, we will show that there cannot exist
s ∈ C(Γ,%R), such that s = (x,R′), where R′ 6= R. Indeed, suppose otherwise.
Then, any partially honest agent can move to t = (x,R), since t ∈ T Γ(R) and
s /∈ T Γ(R). So, for all s ∈ C(Γ,%R), s = (y,R).
Second, we will show that there cannot exist s ∈ C(Γ,%R), such that s = (y,R)
where y /∈ φ(R). Suppose that this is the case. Then, any agent is entitled to
change s to any state t. So, it must be that for all i ∈ N , Y ⊆ Li(y,R). This
fulfills the premises of unanimity, so it must be that y ∈ φ(R) and we have a
contradiction. So, we have that s ∈ C(Γ, R) if and only if s = (y,R), with
y ∈ φ(R). This completes the proof.
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4.4 Comments and conclusion
In the canonical rights structure constructions of Koray and Yildiz (2018) and
Korpela et al. (2018), states are either of the form s = (x,R) where x ∈ φ(R), or
simply s = x. In the interpretation of Yildiz (2019), this means that there either
every outcome is supported by the appropriate “context” or frame, or there is no
context. In our canonical rights structure, we utlized inappropriate contexts to
eliminate outcomes that are not socially optimal, as Dutta and Sen (2012) do in
the case of Nash implementation with noncooperative game forms. Most impor-
tantly though, our permissive results are obtained with a very weak assumption
on the number of partially honest agents, contrary to most of the literature in
implementation with partial honesty, Dutta and Sen (2012) excluded, where in
order to get the most positive results, extreme assumptions about the number of
partially honest agents are made.
Our paper carries the positive results on noncooperative implementation with
motives to the cooperative implementation framework. We feel that our results
outline the merits of the cooperative approach in implementation theory. Never-
theless, our study was only one of the possible ways of incorporating motives into a
cooperative game-theoretic framework and it would be interesting to explore other
possible ways.
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